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AN ANALYTIC "GAP":
THE PERILS OF RELENTLESS ENFORCEMENT OF
PAYMENT-BY-UNDERLYING-INSURER-ONLY
LANGUAGE IN EXCESS INSURANCE POLICIES
Jeffrey W Stempel
ABSTRACT
Excess liability insurance, as the phrase implies, sits atop primary insur-
ance or a lower layer of excess insurance and is required to cover only
claims that are above the policy's "underlying limit" and reach the "at-
tachment point" of the excess policy in question. Historically, the law
was largely indifferent to whether the underlying limit was exhausted by
full payment from the underlying insurer or by other means such as pay-
ment by the policyholder due to an underlying insurer's insolvency or be-
cause the policyholder and underlying insurer had compromised a cover-
age dispute for less than 100 percent coverage by the underlying insurer,
with the policyholder "filling the gap" of the remaining underlying limit
in order to reach the attachment point of an excess policy.
This was the legacy of the 1928 Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding Co. case, a
short but influential Augustus Hand decision. Over time, excess insurers
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began adding language to their policies that stated the entire underlying
limit should be paid solely by an underlying insurer in order to trigger
coverage. Courts have generally enforced such language and the American
Law Institute's draft Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance has
endorsed this approach.
But both the ALI and courts enforcing anti-Zeig "payment-only-by-
underlying-insurer" clauses have failed to fully appreciate the pernicious
impact of literal application of these provisions, which are often in the na-
ture of boilerplate language that is not specifically negotiated or appreci-
ated by policyholders. Routine application of anti-Zeig clauses runs coun-
ter to traditional contract concepts as well as to the overall socioeconomic
objectives of insurance and sound risk management.
Several alternative approaches would better serve the risk management
objectives of excess liability insurance. One modest alternative would be to
enforce payment-only-by-underlying-insurer clauses only if they are the
product of specific negotiation and understanding of the parties. Another
would be to treat these clauses like anti-assignment clauses, which are not
enforced when a policyholder assigns insurance rights after a loss because
the rationale for the clause has evaporated since the assignment involves
no increase of risk to the insurer. In similar fashion, an excess insurer appears
in many cases to have no valid interest in the source of satisfaction of an un-
derlying limit. A third and preferred approach-one fairest to excess insurers
fearing that attachment will be achieved through suspect settlements de-
signed to access towers of excess insurance without sufficient vetting of
claims-would be to treat payment-only-by-underlying-insurer clauses in
a manner akin to notice provisions, where late notice by the policyholder
bars coverage only if the insurer can demonstrate substantial prejudice.
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. INTRODUCTION
A. The Nature of Excess Insurance
Excess liability insurance plays an important role in risk management.
Businesses and governments often purchase liability insurance in "towers"
of coverage composed of various "layers" of coverage.1 After typically
1. Liability insurance is often purchased in towers (e.g., $1 million primary, $5 million
first level excess, $10 million second level excess, $20 million third level excess) both because
an individual insurer might balk at taking on so much risk from a single policyholder (at least
in a single primary policy) and because purchasing liability insurance in layers reduces pre-
mium costs. Although businesses are sued with some frequency, large losses are compara-
tively rare. See Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime (Am.), Inc., 649 F.3d 417, 422 (5th Cin.
2011) (applying Louisiana law) ("Because coverage is only triggered after the primary insur-
ance limit has been exhausted, excess insurance is generally available at a lesser cost than the
primary policy since the risk of loss is less than for the primary insurer.") (internal quotation
marks omitted). But when the high-level excess policy is reached, the excess insurer could
owe a very large amount (e.g., $20 million in this example) even though it did not charge
a particularly high premium for the policy. See generally EMMETr J. VAUGHN & THERESE
VAUGHN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 631-33 (8th ed. 1999); GEORGE REJDA, PRIN-
CIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 321-22 (9th ed. 2004) (same); JAMES S. TRIESCH-
MANN, ROBERT E. HOYT & DAVID W. SOMMER, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 213-14
(12th ed. 2005) (same). But because of the economics of insurance in which premiums are col-
lected and invested long before losses are paid, insurers can profit in spite of paying large
losses. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL & KNUTSEN ON INSURANCE COV-
ERAGE § 1.03 [A] (4th ed. 2016); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAw & REGULATION 108-13
(4th ed. 2005); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance
After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CoNN. INS. L.J. 349, 353 (2006); Letter from Warren Buffet
to Shareholders (2000), at 8-1, http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2000.html (describ-
ing great benefits of earning investment income on the "float," which he describes as "money
we hold but do not own" and praising the company's 1966 acquisition of National Indemnity
Company and National Fire & Marine Insurance Co. as a significant engine of Berkshire's
growth, estimating that the acquisition has resulted in more than $100 billion in income).
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agreeing to assume some of the risk itself through a retention or deduct-
ible, the policyholder typically purchases a primary policy, followed by a
first-layer excess policy, second-layer excess policy, and so on.2 The goal
is to assemble a tower of liability protection at an affordable price.
Primary insurance is considerably more expensive per $1,000 than is
excess insurance not only because of the greater risk of claims but also
both because the primary insurer typically has a duty to defend suits,
with defense costs ordinarily not eroding the policy limits,3 and because
comparatively few claims involve amounts larger than the limits of the
primary policy. Excess insurance, even in large amounts, is comparatively
2. This article will primarily discuss excess liability insurance rather than excess property
insurance. Excess liability insurance in the United States is most commonly sold to busi-
nesses as "general" liability insurance, director's and officer's liability insurance, or commer-
cial automobile liability insurance. Personal lines excess coverage also exists but largely in the
form of personal umbrella policies so as to provide additional liability protection to
individuals.
3. The typical primary general liability policy requires the insurer to defend potentially
covered claims against the policyholder (and other persons qualifying as "insureds" under
the policy) based on the allegations of the complaint with defense expenses incurred by
the insurer not eroding the limits of the policy. See RANDY J. MANILOFF & JEFFREY W. STEM-
PEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE: KEY ISSUES IN EVERY STATE, at ch. 5 (3d ed.
2015) (also noting differences among jurisdictions regarding use of extrinsic evidence in ad-
dition to examination of the face of the complaint and insurance policy); JEFFREY W. STEM-
PEL, PETER NASH SWISHER & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAw 595-604 (4th
ed. 2012). After a business policyholder is sued, the policyholder refers or "tenders" the law-
suit to the primary insurer and asks the primary insurer to provide a defense. The primary
liability insurer has a "duty to defend" a potentially covered lawsuit against the policyholder.
If a single contention of the plaintiff is potentially covered, the insurer must defend the
entire lawsuit. Insurers may defend pursuant to a "reservation of rights" to contest ultimate
coverage, which means that the insurer will defend the claim until issues of coverage are re-
solved by the court (or by a compromise settlement on coverage between the insurer and the
policyholder). See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1, § 9.03 [C]. See also RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §§ 13-27 (Proposed Final Draft) (Am. LAW INST.
Mar. 28, 2017) (restating norms regarding duty to defend in general, including reservation
of rights and providing commentary and case law discussion).
The standard general liability policy gives the insurer the right and duty to defend claims.
As is oft-stated in the case law, the duty to defend is "broader" than the duty to pay claims:
the duty to pay is based on the actual determination of coverage under the facts of the case as
adjudicated, while the duty to defend is based on the "potential" for coverage based upon the
allegations of the plaintiff's complaint (the so-called four corners, or, in some jurisdictions,
eight corners, test based upon comparison of the face of complaint and the face of the pol-
icy). See MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra, at ch. 5.
In addition to having a "duty to defend," the primary insurer in the United States usually
also has a "duty to settle," or what might better be described as a duty to make reasonable
settlement decisions. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 24(1)
("Xhen an insurer has the authority to settle a legal action brought against the insured or
the authority to settle the action rests with the insured but the insurer's prior consent is re-
quired for any settlement to be payable by the insurer, and there is a potential for a judgment
in excess of the applicable policy limit, the insurer has a duty to the insured to make reason-
able settlement decisions."); STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1, § 9.05[B]; STEMPEL,
SwISHER & KNUTSEN, supra, at 628, 633; Kent Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV.
1113 (1990).
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less expensive because any defense costs paid by the excess insurer reduce
the limits of coverage rather than being "outside limits" as is typically the
case for primary insurers4 and because the excess insurer need not provide
coverage until underlying limits of insurance have been "exhausted"5 and
the "attachment point"' of the excess policy has been reached.
For example, a small business policyholder may have a $10,000 reten-
tion, followed by a $1 million primary commercial general liability (CGL)
policy, followed by a $5 million first-layer excess policy and a $10 million
second-layer excess policy. A larger business may have as much as a $1 mil-
lion retention, a $5 million primary policy, a $10 million first-layer excess
policy, a $15 million second-layer excess policy, a $25 million third-layer
excess policy, a $50 million fourth-layer excess policy, and a $100 million
fifth-layer excess policy.
The excess policy typically "follows form" to the underlying primary
insurance and provides the same coverage so that the full tower of liability
insurance is seamless.7 Whatever is covered in the primary policy should
be covered by the first-layer excess policy, and so on. These arrangements
typically work without undue controversy. But, as discussed below, where
one of the lower-layer insurers is insolvent or contests coverage, this cre-
ates problems.
In the case of insolvency, the policyholder will generally be responsible
for the amount of coverage that would have been provided by the insol-
vent insurer and must pay this amount itself. But because these payments
are not made by an underlying insurer, an excess insurer may argue that
its attachment point has never been reached. In a case of disputed cover-
age, the policyholder and the underling insurer may compromise the mat-
ter, with the underlying insurer paying less than full policy limits and the
policyholder making up the difference. As discussed below, where an ex-
cess policy contains a payment-only-by-underlying-insurer clause, this
4. As noted above (note 1), a primary insurer's expenditures defending the policyholder
normally do not erode policy limits. See DPC Indus., Inc. v. Am. Specialty Lines Ins., 615
F.3d 609, 615 n.3 (5th Ci. 2010) (observing that most policies provide for defense in addi-
tion to indemnity limits); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 14(3) ("Un-
less otherwise stated in the policy, the costs of the defense of the action are borne by the in-
surer in addition to the policy limits"); ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES
§ 4.12 (5th ed. 2012) ("sums paid by the insurer pursuant to its duty to defend are owed in
addition to the full policy limit").
5. "Exhaustion" is a term of art in insurance that refers to the limits of a policy no longer
being available through payment of claims.
6. The "attachment point" refers to the dollar amount at which the excess insurance is
triggered and required to respond to a claim.
7. Following form means that the scope of coverage provided by the excess policy is con-
gruent with that provided by the underlying policy. See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1,
§ 16.01.
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also poses the risk that the excess insurer sitting above this settling insurer
will contend that its attachment point has not been properly reached.
This article examines whether an excess insurer must respond when-
ever its "underlying limit" has been paid-by any source-or whether
the excess insurer can insist on enforcing policy language that states
that the underlying limit can be satisfied only by payments from the un-
derlying insurer-with no "filling of the gap" by the policyholder.
B. The Dilemma Posed by Payment-Only-by-Underlying-Insurer Clauses:
Policy Text vs. Purpose, Function, and Social Utility (and at Least One
Party's Intent)
How should insurance law treat situations of insolvency or settlement in
which the underlying limit is not satisfied completely by underlying in-
surer payments? On the one hand, if the excess insurance policy has lan-
guage requiring that payment of the underlying limit come only from the
underlying insurer, the excess carrier has a pretty good argument that this
is what the "contract" requires. But on the other hand, strict enforcement
of such policy provisions discourages settlements and can work real un-
fairness to a policyholder that has paid frequently substantial premiums
and now finds itself unable to access even a cent of the purchased excess
coverage due to settlement. In cases of underlying insurer insolvency,
where the policyholder cannot be blamed for taking the risk of settlement
in the face of a payment-only-by-underlying-insurer clause (which the
policyholder, its broker, and counsel may have simply missed),' the forfei-
ture of excess insurance coverage seems a particularly severe penalty.
Courts are divided on this issue. Although there is not a large body of
case law, more recent decisions have been receptive to enforcing language
in the policy requiring that the underlying limit may be satisfied only
through payment by the underlying insurance company. The American
Law Institute (ALI), in the current draft of its Restatement of the Law
of Liability Insurance,9 takes the position that such language in excess li-
8. Or the policyholder and counsel may simply have miscalculated judicial treatment of
the "payment by insurer only" clause, reasoning in a jurisdiction without clear precedent
that the clause would not be strictly enforced.
9. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 40, which was substantially
approved by the Institute on May 16, 2016, at its Annual Meeting. Additional sections of
the Restatement and the Restatement as a whole are expected to be submitted to the Institute
for final approval at the 2018 Annual Meeting. The ALI project began in 2010 as the Prin-
ciples of the Law of Liability Insurance and was converted to a Restatement during the fall of
2014. The difference between publishing a Restatement and publishing Principles is not par-
ticularly pronounced. The primary distinction is that Restatements are focused primarily on
stating what the law is, albeit with recognition of minority and majority rules and commen-
tary; a Principles project is viewed as less bound by the strict letter of the law and less con-
strained in advocating resolutions that are not particular established by case law. See AM. LAW
INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AM. LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS
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ability policies should be enforced. At the same time, there is, as one
might expect, considerable sentiment, particularly among policyholder
counsel (but also brokers and academics) for resisting literal enforcement
of a requirement that only underlying insurer payments can satisfy the un-
derlying limit.
The concern of opponents of the ALI position is that language in an
insurance policy may be boilerplate language in a form that is not closely
read or understood by policyholders and should not be strictly enforced. 10
It may not reflect the intent of the parties (certainly not that of many pol-
icyholders, particularly those ill-served by their brokers) and certainly un-
dermines the basic purpose of excess insurance (to provide needed addi-
tional coverage when policyholder liability reaches a certain amount). It
also creates a variety of pernicious socioeconomic effects: undermining
risk distribution; threatening business solvency; undercompensating vic-
tims; increasing disputing costs; creating undue forfeiture of contract ben-
efits and windfalls for excess insurers based on events that do not really
harm the excess insurer.
I. THE CONFLICT OVER WHEN AN UNDERLYING LIMIT HAS
BEEN EXHAUSTED AND THE ATTACHMENT POINT OF
EXCESS INSURANCE HAS BEEN REACHED
Under ordinary circumstances, the policyholder, the primary insurer, the
excess insurers, and their attorneys all work together to defend a claim
(through trial and appeal if it is viewed as a weak claim) or, more com-
monly, to settle the claim within the limits of the policies spanned by
the claim. Disputes can arise, however, when these parties have different
interests and there are concerns on the part of an excess insurer about
whether its attachment point has been reached only after sufficient resis-
tance to the claim by the policyholder and underlying insurers.11
and Those Who Review Their Work 4-14 (2005) [hereinafter ALI HANDBOOK], http://www.
ali.org/doc/StyleManual.pdf. To the extent the difference is meaningful, a Principles of in-
surance document is logically less cabined by the actual law than is a Restatement, although
the difference is, as a practical matter, probably only one of degree. The Restatement was
scheduled to be formally and finally approved at the May 2017 Annual Meeting, but in re-
sponse to concerns expressed by insurer representatives, the Institute deferred final decision
until 2018 to permit additional commentary on the document. Section 40, the topic of this
article, was not discussed at the 2017 Meeting and, of course, is not a provision to which in-
surers would object.
10. See text and accompanying notes 43-49, infra, describing disagreement of some ALI
members with § 40 and the failed amendment attempt.
11. See generally Douglas Richmond, The Rights and Responsibilities of Excess Insurers, 78
DEN. U. L. REV. 29 (2000); Michael M. Marick, Excess Insurance: An Overview of General Prin-
ciples and Current Issues, 24 TORT & INs. LJ. 715 (1989); see also Syverud, supra note 3, at
1202, n.248 (discussing issues surrounding excess insurers' potential settlement obligations,
particularly in cases where the primary insurer fails to defend or settle).
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Excess insurance is designed to begin providing coverage when the
"underlying limit" of primary insurance has been exhausted. Usually
this takes place in straightforward fashion because the primary insurer
has paid or is required to pay its entire policy limit as part of a settlement
or judgment against the policyholder. But, as discussed below, there are
circumstances where the primary insurer may not pay full policy limits
but the underlying limit has been satisfied, usually through payment by
the policyholder in order to reach the attachment point of the next
layer of excess insurance. In these cases, excess insurers may argue that
their attachment points can be reached only if it is an underlying insurer
that has paid the money to reach the attachment point.
As a result, the issue of when an excess insurance policy's "attachment
point" has been reached becomes crucial. Until the attachment point has
been reached, the excess insurer is not required to provide coverage. But
once the "underlying limit" of coverage has been satisfied and the attach-
ment point has been reached, excess policies are responsible, often for
millions of dollars of coverage.
The issue may present itself when underlying insurance is unavailable
because of insolvency or when an underlying insurer and the policyholder
are in a coverage dispute and resolve that dispute by having the underlying
insurer pay something less than full policy limits-with the policyholder
paying an additional amount necessary to reach the policy limit-and then
seeking further coverage from the excess insurer that sits "atop" the lower
insurer in a "tower" of insurance coverage. When an underlying insurer is
insolvent or pays less than its full share because of a coverage dispute with
the policyholder, forcing the policyholder to "fill the gap" between the
amount received by the underlying insurer and the attachment point of
the excess policy, a conflict arises. Contrary to the excess insurer, the pol-
icyholder takes the position that the excess insurance attachment point
has been reached and that it is irrelevant where the money comes from
in order to reach the attachment point.
A. Excess Insurer Arguments for Strict Enforcement of
Payment- Only-by-Underlying-Insurer Provisions
Excess insurers contend that a clear term of its policy (e.g., "the underly-
ing limit must be paid by an underlying insurer" 12) should be enforced
and that enforcement is necessary to prevent policyholders from paying
12. Or, to quote real-world examples from prominent cases:
Coverage hereunder shall attach only after all such "Underlying Insurance" has been re-
duced or exhausted by payments for losses . . . [and in] the event of the depletion of the
limit(s) of liability of the "Underlying Insurance solely as a result of actual payment of loss
thereunder by the applicable insurers, this Policy shall continue to apply to loss as excess
over the amount of insurance remaining.
8 15
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a relatively small amount of money (some portion of the primary policy
limits or all of the primary policy limits) in order to reach a much larger
amount of money that is the excess insurance policy limit."
Excess insurers argue that requiring payment to come from an under-
lying insurer provides the excess insurer with the protection of having the
lawsuit fought hard by a primary insurer. Excess insurers contend that it is
otherwise too easy for a plaintiff and a policyholder and a primary insurer
with relatively low limits to reach a deal that serves their purposes at the
expense of the excess insurer (and other excess insurers higher up in the
tower of coverage). 14
As discussed below, 15 these arguments are not persuasive in situations
where the policyholder has, in fact, incurred liability and expended funds
to fill any gap between primary insurer payment and the excess insurer's
attachment point-at least so long as a coverage compromise with an un-
derlying insurer is not fraudulent, collusive, or substantively unreason-
able. Where policyholders pay "real money" or its equivalent to replace
(in cases of insolvency) or "top off" underlying insurer payment or gaps
in coverage due to insolvency or compromise of a coverage dispute, the
prospect of collusion aimed at shifting liability to the insured is suffi-
Comerica, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1022 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (em-
phasis added).
Underwriters shall be liable only after the insurers under each of the Underlying policies
have paid or have been held liable to pay the full amount of the Underlying Limit of Liability.
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App.
2008) (emphasis in original).
[Attachment requires that] (a) all Underlying Insurance carriers have paid in cash the full
amount of their respective liabilities, (b) the full amount of the Underlying Insurance pol-
icies have been collected by the plaintiffs, the Insureds or the Insureds' counsel, and (c) all
Underlying Insurance has been exhausted.
See Citigroup Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 367, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying Texas law)
(holding that this policy "leaves no ambiguity about how the underlying policy is exhausted.
The policy clearly explains that exhaustion occurs through payment, in cash, and of the full
amount of the underlying insurer's limit of liability.").
13. See Qualcomm, Inc., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (the leading case); Comerica, In, 498
F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (another prominent case in this line). Accord, Ali v. Fed. Ins. Co., 719
F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying New York law) (excess insurers had "good reason to
require actual payment up to the attachment points of the relevant policies, thus deterring
the possibility of settlement [of the underlying lawsuit] manipulation"); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Sri-
vastava, 2 F.3d 98, 103 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying Texas law) (noting that unless amount of
claim or loss is set, there is danger that primary insurers could, "contrary to the con-
tracted-for risk," shift part of their burden to excess carriers); Quellos Grp. v. Fed. Ins.
Co., 312 P.3d 734 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
14. See, e.g., Qualcomm, Inc., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770. Accord Comerica, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d at
1022.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 54-96 (addressing problems created by literal en-
forcement of payment-by-underlying-insurer-only clauses).
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ciently low that excess insurers should not be able to escape coverage re-
sponsibility based solely on the source of the underlying payments.
But where the attachment point of an excess policy is allegedly reached
only by exhaustion of an underlying policy by a below-limits settlement
alone without any payment by the policyholder, excess insurers have
grounds for questioning whether an attachment point has been met
through legitimate means.16 This article does not endorse the view that,
for example, settling a coverage dispute with a $1 million primary insurer
for $500,000 requires that the $5 million first-layer excess insurer must
begin providing coverage at the $500,000 mark rather than the $1 million
attachment point set forth in the excess policy. Consequently, excess in-
surer arguments aimed at avoiding what might be termed "de facto
drop-down due to settlement,"17 which have considerable force, do not
16. See John F. O'Connor, Caveat Settlor: Insurance Coverage Settlements and the Triumph of
Policy Language over Precedent, 79ALB. L. REV. 101 (2015) [hereinafter O'Connor, Caveat Set-
tlor]; John F. O'Connor, Insurance Coverage Settlements and the Rights ofExcess Insurers, 62 MD.
L. REV. 30 (2003) [hereinafter O'Connor, Rights ofExcess Insurers] (arguing against consider-
ing underlying insurance to be exhausted solely by primary insurer's compromise of coverage
dispute for amount below primary policy limits); see also Scott M. Seaman & Charlene Kit-
tredge, Excess Liability Insurance: Law and Litigation, 32 TORT & INs. L.J. 653 (1997); Tho-
mas M. Bower, Partial Settlements by Primary Insurers: The Law, 29 TORT & INs. L.J. 536
(1994).
17. "Drop-down" liability of an excess insurer takes place when the excess carrier is re-
quired to attach at a point lower than that stated in its policy due to the insolvency of an
underlying insurer. See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1, § 16.03 [B]. It is largely a histor-
ical relic. Earlier versions of excess policies sometimes contained exhaustion and attachment
language that triggered the excess insurance once the amount of "recoverable" or "collect-
ible" underlying insurance had been met. Because insolvent underlying insurance is not re-
coverable, this was sometimes held to make the excess insurance attachment point corre-
spondingly lower, in effect forcing the excess insurer to drop down. See, e.g., Reserve Ins.
Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764 (Cal. 1982) (finding amount-recoverable language to require
excess insurer to drop down to insolvent primary insurer's level); MacNeal, Inc. v. Interstate
Fire & Cas. Co., 477 N.E.2d 1322 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985) (finding amount-recoverable attach-
ment language sufficiently ambiguous to be resolved in favor of policyholder). In the absence
of such language, which insurers have long avoided in order to minimize drop-down liability,
courts have rather consistently refused to require an excess insurer to attach at a level below
that stated in the policy. See, e.g., Zurich Ins. Co. v. Heil Co., 815 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1987)
(applying Illinois law).
This article does not endorse drop-down liability for excess insurers but merely argues
that an excess insurer should attach whenever its underlying limit has been satisfied by pay-
ment regardless of the identity of the payer. Although this payment should ordinarily be in
cash or its equivalent, payment by other means (e.g., dismissing a counterclaim of demon-
strable value) may at times suffice. An exploration of the types of noncash payments sufficient
to satisfy underlying limits and reach excess insurance attachment points is beyond the scope
of this article.
Also beyond the scope of this article are settlements between a policyholder/defendant and
a plaintiff in which the plaintiff receives an assignment of defendant rights to a liability policy
that includes confessions of judgment and stipulations regarding liability and damages pur-
suant to particular state tort law provisions. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Great Am. Assurance Co.,
337 S.W.3d 700, 703 (Mo. 2011) (discussing "section 547.065 agreement" established pur-
suant to Missouri law).
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undermine the thesis of this article-that excess insurance should attach
after the underlying limit has been met through any combination of
real value paid by underlying insurers and policyholders.1 8
B. Policyholder Arguments That Source of Payment Should Not Ordinarily
Matter (and Their Limits)
Excess insurer arguments for enforcement of payment-only-by-underlying-
insurer clauses are not baseless but neither are they very persuasive. For
one, if the excess insurer's fear is that it will be victimized by a conspiracy
among plaintiff, policyholder, and primary insurer, that same risk exists al-
most as much if a primary insurer with relatively low limits pays its full lim-
its of coverage. For example, a primary insurer with limits of $50,000 or
$100,000 that is forced to defend (with defense costs outside limits) a seri-
ous claim or group of claims hardly needs the policyholder to tell it that
exhausting the policy quickly will transfer coverage responsibilities to the
excess insurer and free the primary carrier from the burdens of protracted
defense. 19
In addition, if the excess insurer feels it has been victimized by a
"sweetheart deal" that was not truly at "arm's length" but was done by
parties trying to accommodate one another in order to take advantage
of the excess insurer, the excess insurer has the right to challenge the set-
tlement on the grounds that it was fraudulent, the product of collusion, a
sham settlement, or unreasonable in amount or terms.20 In other words,
the excess insurer concerned about being "set up" by the policyholder and
underlying insurer(s) can litigate that issue on its merits and avoid or re-
18. See, e.g., O'Connor, Caveat Settlor, supra note 16; O'Connor, Rights ofExcess Insurers,
supra note 16. One insurer counsel (the author was then with Steptoe & Johnson, a firm well
known for representing insurers in coverage matters) once appeared to agree with the thesis
of this article. See Rights ofExcess Insurers at 34 ("most courts correctly have held that a pol-
icyholder must fill any gap in coverage caused by its below-limits settlements, thereby pre-
cluding a policyholder and its lower-level insurers from adversely affecting a non-settling ex-
cess insurer's coverage obligations through their own settlement") (footnote omitted).
Subsequently, he more clearly embraced the insurer position that "payment-required-by-
underlying-insurer-only" clauses should be strictly enforced in favor of excess insurers. See
Caveat Settlor.
19. Substantive law limits the primary insurer's ability to do this without penalty, in that a
primary insurer's unreasonable exhaustion of policy limits through unduly fast and generous
settlement in order to prematurely terminate defense obligations constitutes bad faith that
provides the policyholder with a claim for relief, characterized as tort in most states, that
could subject the primary insurer to extra-contractual damages, including punitive damages.
See generally MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 3, at ch. 21 (discussing standards for determin-
ing bad faith and consequences); STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1, at ch. 10 (discussing bad
faith concept and liability).
20. See Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1982) (insurer may challenge settle-
ment to which it did not agree and avoid coverage if settlement substantively unreasonable
or result of fraud or collusion); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Morris, 741 P.2d 246 (Ariz.
1987) (same); STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1, § 10.
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duce coverage if it prevails on the merits. If, for example, discovery reveals
an unreasonable settlement or that the policyholder's filling of a gap was
paid in name only without actual cash or its equivalent, the excess insurer
can defeat coverage on the merits irrespective of the presence or absence
of a payment-only-by-underlying-insurer clause.
In contrast to putting the excess insurer to its proof regarding its fears of
insufficiently vigorous defense below, robotic enforcement of underlying-
insurer-must-pay clauses creates a total forfeiture of coverage likely to be
well out of proportion to any injury inflicted on the excess carrier. Allowing
the excess insurer to escape all coverage responsibility merely because the
policyholder compromised a coverage dispute (and certainly because of
the mere happenstance of insolvency of an underlying carrier) effectively
provides excess insurers with a "super-exclusion" that, even if supported
by reasonably clear policy text, becomes an unfair windfall that visits a
disproportionate forfeiture upon the policyholder while simultaneously dis-
couraging settlement and increasing judicial workload.
Furthermore, when making a settlement that was not approved by the
insurer, the policyholder is generally required to bear the burden of per-
suasion regarding the reasonableness of the settlement terms 2 1 while the
insurer logically bears the burden of persuasion to show fraud or collusion
regarding the settlement. The excess insurer may challenge the reason-
ableness of a settlement or its procedure even if it loses the attachment
point or failure-to-satisfy-underlying-limit defense. 22 As a matter of na-
tional judicial policy, settlement is generally encouraged. 23 But if payment-
only-by-underlying-insurer clauses are enforced literally, a policyholder can-
not settle a coverage dispute with an underlying insurer without losing all of
its remaining excess coverage. As a practical matter, this means that settle-
ment will be much more difficult and can be achieved only if all insurers
in a tower (or at least up to the limit of the liability exposure presented by
the case) agree to the settlement.
21. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 25(3)(c) &(d) (Proposed
Final Draft) (AM. LAW INST. Mar. 28, 2017). See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. VanPortHomes,
Inc., 58 P.2d 276 (Wash. 2002) (policyholder must show reasonableness of settlement or
consent judgment; once this is shown, burden shifts to insurer "to show the settlement
was the product of fraud or collusion").
22. See Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 (insurer may challenge settlement to which it did not
agree and avoid coverage if settlement substantively unreasonable or result of fraud or col-
lusion); Morris, 741 P.2d 246 (same); STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1, §§ 9.03-9.05.
23. See generally Crosby v. Jones, 705 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 1998) (settlement of claims
encouraged as a matter of public policy); see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Symposium on
Civil Justice Reform: "Most Cases Settle ": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1364 (1994) (more than 95 percent of cases settle before trial). But
see Owen Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that a min-
imum number of cases must be adjudicated or development of law atrophies and rights are
not sufficiently vindicated in public forum).
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This in turn gives an individual excess insurer too much leverage in set-
tlement discussions. With settlement undermined in this way, an addi-
tional practical impact is reduced settlement, which in turn requires
additional and more extensive litigation. This in turn raises disputing
costs imposed on the parties, the judicial system, and society at large.24
Policyholders have raised this point with limited success.2 s More success-
ful have been arguments based on the lack of clarity of excess insurer
exhaustion clauses. Even when they appear to have payment-only-by-
underlying-insurer clauses, these provisions have sometimes been found
insufficiently clear to permit the excess insurer to avoid attachment.
Although contending that an insurance policy is ambiguous is a time-
honored first line of argument for policyholder counsel, it has increas-
ingly become a losing argument if the excess insurer's payment-only-
by-underlying-insurer language is sufficiently clear. Insurers, being per-
haps the paradigmatic "repeat players" in litigation, 26 will inevitably
generate sufficiently clear clauses. Standard-issue neoclassical contract
theory focusing heavily on policy text thus favors excess insurers in the
long run-with pernicious results. Adoption of the ALI Restatement that
such clauses should be literally enforced will likely further shift the tide
in favor of insurers.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ISSUE
For decades, it was apparently accepted that a policyholder with less than
100 percent of its underlying policy available (because of insolvency or a
compromise with the underlying insurer regarding coverage) could use its
own funds to "fill the gap" between what had been paid by the underlying
24. In the interests of clarity and keeping this article to something resembling a reason-
able length, I have provided fairly simply hypotheticals in which each excess layer of coverage
is provided by a single excess insurer. In practice, excess layers are often composed of a com-
bination of insurers, each signing on to a percentage of the risk. It is not particularly unusual
to have as many as a dozen insurers (including Lloyd's or London Market entities) compris-
ing an excess layer. To the extent each of these is considered an "underlying insurer," there
exists the potential for an insurer with only 5 percent of the risk in a given layer to effectively
impede resolution of a $200 million matter.
25. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 40; text accompanying
note 13.
26. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits ofLegal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974) (classic article positing the now widely accepted view
that institutional "repeat player" litigants, such as governments, businesses, and insurers,
have a substantial advantage over episodic "one shot" litigants, such as individual plaintiffs
in pursuing legal relief). The institutional player can more readily spread disputing costs
and capture the benefits of past experience, even negative past experience; for example, an
insurer that loses a coverage dispute can revise policy language to minimize the risk of similar
losses in the future). Plaintiffs and policyholders may be able to obtain some of the advan-
tages of repeat players if they retain experienced counsel-but there is, of course, no guar-
anty that individuals and small businesses will select such counsel.
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insurer and the full underlying limit, thereby "triggering" the attachment
of the excess insurance. Over time, excess insurers increasingly inserted
language into their policies stating that the underlying limit must be
paid by an underlying insurer, implying that payment of the underlying
limit by other sources is not sufficient. During the past two decades,
courts became increasingly receptive to enforcing such language.
A. The Traditional Zeig Approach
For most of the twentieth century, the leading case on this issue was Zeig v.
Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., 2 7 which essentially holds that an
excess insurer's attachment point is reached when the underlying limit
is satisfied, regardless of whether that payment is made by an underlying
insurer or the policyholder or a combination of the two. Zeig also took the
position that satisfaction of the underlying limit could be through com-
promise or forgiveness of a claim as well as an actual cash payment so
long as the policyholder could demonstrate that the amount of a loss or
claim met or exceeded the excess insurer's attachment point.2 8
Ironically, Zeig involved a first-party property insurance claim. But its
analysis is readily applicable to third-party liability insurance matters. In
Zeig, the policyholder (Manhattan dressmaker Louis Zeig) had purchased
$15,000 of property insurance as well as the Massachusetts Bonding ex-
cess policy at issue. The insured property was burglarized, resulting in
claimed losses of more than $15,000. The primary insurer disputed the
amount of covered loss and settled with Zeig for $6,000. He then sought
excess insurance coverage for the amount of loss exceeding $15,000, argu-
ing that the $15,000 underlying limit had been satisfied due to the com-
bination of the $6,000 paid by the primary insurer and that as policy-
holder he was entitled to additional coverage because the actual amount
of the burglary loss exceeded $15,000.29
27. 23 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1928) (applying New York law).
28. This aspect of Zeig is sometimes over-read by both its supporters and its critics. Sup-
porters may note that, pursuant to Zeig, settlement that releases the underlying insurer from
liability exhausts the underlying limit even if the policyholder does not make additional pay-
ments. This reading is a bit misleading in that it implies that the settling policyholder can
then receive excess insurance benefits without more. However, Zeig makes it quite clear
that there is more to be done by the policyholder. Even if the policyholder does not make
a cash outlay, it must nonetheless demonstrate loss or liability in an amount equal to the un-
derlying limit, regardless of the amount paid by underlying insurers. The attached excess in-
surer retains the right to contest coverage based on other defenses, such as exclusions, breach
of conditions, fraud, collusion, or an unreasonably generous settlement with the claimant.
Conversely, excess insurers sometimes over-read Zeig as requiring cash outlays by the poli-
cyholder equal to the difference in amount between the underlying insurer's settlement pay-
ments and the excess insurer's attachment points. Zeig, however, appears to permit the pol-
icyholder to access excess insurance by demonstrating the amount of the claim without
regard to out-of-pocket payments.
29. See Zeig, 23 F.2d at 666.
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The excess insurer argued that unless the underlying primary insurer
had itself paid the full $15,000 primary policy limits, there could be no
triggering of excess coverage. The trial judge agreed with the excess in-
surer, essentially concluding that policyholder Zeig had forfeited his
right to obtain excess insurance by settling with his primary insurer for
less than 100 cents on the dollar. The Second Circuit reversed, ruling
that the policyholder should be entitled to "prove the amount of his
loss, and, if that loss was greater than the amount of the expressed limits
of the primary insurance, he was entitled to recover the excess to the ex-
tent of the policy in suit." 0 The court reasoned that the defendant excess
insurer
had no rational interest in whether the insured collected the full amount of
the primary policies, so long as it was only called upon to pay such portion of
the loss as was in excess of the limits of those policies. To require an absolute
collection of the primary insurance to its full limit would in many, if not
most, cases involve delay, promote litigation, and prevent an adjustment of
disputes which is both convenient and commendable. A result harmful to
the insured, and of no rational advantage to the insurer ought only to be
reached when the terms of the contract demand it.
We can see no reason for a construction so burdensome to the insured. 1
The excess policy language at issue in Zeig stated that the excess policy
"shall apply and cover only after all other [underlying] insurance . . . shall
have been exhausted in the payment of claims to the full amount of the
expressed limits of such other insurance." 32
Despite siding with the policyholder regarding the issue of the source
of funds satisfying the underlying limit, the Second Circuit in Zeig also
stated that "[i]t is doubtless true that the parties could impose such a con-
dition precedent to liability upon the policy, if they chose to do so."33 But
reading the exhaustion clause in the actual case makes it hard to imagine
how excess carriers could have been any clearer.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. The Zeig court then discussed the particular language of the excess insurance
policy at issue, noting that the policy
provides only that [the underlying limit] be "exhausted in the payment of claims to the full
amount of the expressed limits." The claims are paid to the full amount of the policies, if
they are settled and discharged, and the primary insurance is thereby exhausted. There is
no need of interpreting the word "payment" as only relating to payment in cash.... Only
such portion of the loss as exceeded, not the cash settlement, but the limits of these pol-
icies, is covered by the excess policy.
Id.
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Nevertheless, excess insurers and the ALI in the current Restatement
draft have characterized Zeig as merely stating a "default" rule that can
be changed if the language of an excess policy states that the underlying
limit must be satisfied by payments from an underlying insurer. Although
the Zeig court arguably did not have to decide the issue, the clause in
question appears to have been rather clear and was nonetheless found in-
sufficient by the Second Circuit. In any event, Zeig's statement regarding
power to alter the default rule is arguably mere dicta. Further, its assump-
tion appears to be that the default rule could be altered only if "the par-
ties" actually agreed to such a term-rather than having such a term
merely inserted into an essentially standardized policy form by the excess
insurer. Moreover, a fair reading of the exhaustion clause in Zeig is that
the excess insurer anticipated that the underlying limits would indeed
be "paid by the underlying insurer" 34 but the policyholder nonetheless
was not forced to forfeit coverage due to compromise with the underlying
insurer. Further, it also should be noted that the Zeig court not only stated
that its default rule could be altered by the parties but also that any such
terms regarding the source of satisfaction of the underlying limit should
"demand" enforcement. 3s
Regarding the importance of settlement in liability and insurance cov-
erage litigation, the Zeig court observed that
claims are paid to the full amount of the policies, if they are settled and dis-
charged, and the primary insurance is thereby exhausted. There is no need of
interpreting the word "payment" as only relating to payment in cash. It often
is used as meaning the satisfaction of a claim by compromise or in other
ways. To render the policy in suit applicable, claims had to be and were sat-
isfied and paid to the full limit of the primary policies. Only such portion of
the loss as exceeded, not the cash settlement, but the limits of those policies,
is covered by the excess policy. 6
34. Id. (excess policy provided that it would be "exhausted in the payment of claims to the
full amount of the expressed limits"). Although this phraseology was not sufficiently clear to
save the excess insurer from attachment in the face of a claim large enough to consume the
underlying limit, an excess carrier using this policy language would appear to have expected
that the limit would be paid by an underlying insurer rather than the policyholder or another
entity.
35. See id. ("A result harmful to the insured [which would lose all excess coverage because
of settling at less than 100 cents on the dollar with the primary insurer], and of no rational
advantage to the insurer [which is asked to pay only when its attachment point has been
reached by the size of the loss] ought only be reached when the terms of the contract demand
it.") (emphasis added). Of course, in the ninety years since Zeig, excess insurers have articu-
lated a rational reason for preferring that underlying insurance be exhausted only through
payments by the underlying insurer, arguing that this provides greater assurance that the
claim was thoroughly vetted and defended. But this argument is not powerful enough to jus-
tify a complete forfeiture of excess insurance coverage in cases of insolvency or compromise
of a coverage dispute.
36. See id.
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B. Application of Zeig Fades as Insurers Successfully Add Anti-Zeig
Language to Policies
As noted above, for most of the twentieth century, Zeig was cited as pro-
viding "the rule" regarding satisfaction of the underlying limit and attach-
ment of the excess policy.37 Many early twenty-first-century cases contin-
ued this pattern.3 8 Eventually, however, insurers realized that Zeig could
37. See, e.g., Koppers Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1454 (3d Cin. 1996)
(applying Pennsylvania law) (approving Zeig and noting that "settlement with the primary in-
surer functionally 'exhausts' primary coverage and therefore triggers the excess policy by set-
tling the policyholder loses any right to coverage of the difference between the settlement
amount and the primary policy's limits"); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 106 F.3d
258 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying Ohio law) (noting Zeig approach with apparent approval);
Christiana Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 268 (2d Ci. 1992) (applying
New York law) (summarizing Zeig as stating that "excess carrier must pay claims to extent
its layer is pierced even though underlying carrier settled with insured for less than the full
amount of underlying carrier's liability"); Archer Daniels Midland v. Aon Risk Servs., Inc.,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23527 (D. Minn. Feb. 25, 1999) (applying Minnesota and Illinois
law); Gould, Inc. v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22609, at *7-8 (M.D.
Pa. Nov. 8, 1995) (describing Zeig as "seminal case on exhaustion of underlying insurance"
and applying Zeig to permit policyholder to contribute payment to reach underlying limit
and attachment point of excess insurance policy); Stargatt v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 67 F.R.D.
689 (1975) (predicting Delaware law) (applying Zeig and construing Lloyd's excess policy to
be reached so long as the underlying limit was exhausted by settlement or paid to resolve
claims even if payment was not by underlying insurer); Benroth v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 132
F. Supp. 270 (W.D. La. 1955) (finding attachment point of excess policy reached by liability
against policyholder equal to or exceeding underlying limit without regard to source of pay-
ment or actual payment of underlying limit); see also JEFFREY E. THOMAS, NEw APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE LAw LIBRARY EDITION § 24.02 [2] [b] (2012) ("As a general rule, payment of the un-
derlying limits from any source counts toward exhaustion."); Mills Ltd. P'ship v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 2010 Del. Super. LEXIS 563 (Nov. 5, 2010) (policyholder "correctly contends that
'the majority of courts, including courts applying Delaware law, hold that settlement with an
underlying carrier functionally exhausts that carrier's coverage' ") (following Zeig despite excess
policy term stating that the policy "only provides coverage when" the underlying limit is "ex-
hausted by reason of the insurers of the Underlying Policies paying or being held liable to pay
in legal currency the full amount of the Underlying Limits of Liability as loss"; policyholder
had settled with underlying insurers for roughly 80 cents on the dollar).
38. See, e.g., Trinity Homes LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 629 F.3d 653, 658-59 (7th Cin.
2010) (applying Indiana law); Waste Mgmt. of Minn., Inc. v. Transcont'l Ins. Co., 502 F.3d
769 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying Minnesota law); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Aon Risk
Servs., Inc., 356 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Minnesota and Illinois law); Coffeyville
Res. Refining & Mktg., LLC v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 714 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D. Kan.
2010); Drake v. Ryan, 514 N.W.2d 785, 786-87 (Minn. 1994); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 2014 Del. Super. LEXIS 373 (June 6,
2014) (following Zeig approach where excess policy ambiguous as to whether satisfaction
of underlying limit must be by particular payer; in case involving massive Bernard Madoff
Ponzi scheme fraud, policyholder losses actually paid clearly exceeded tower of liability lim-
its, a factor that minimizes risk that underlying insurer will unfairly compromise claim, caus-
ing premature attachment of excess policy); Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co.,
444 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. App. 2014); HLTH Corp. v. Agric. Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 2008
Del. Super. LEXIS 280 (July 31, 2008) (applying Delaware and New Jersey law) (expressly
rejecting reasoning of Qualcomm and Comerica as unduly impeding settlement in litigation);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 825 So. 2d 998, 999-1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001).
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be interpreted as providing only a presumptive or "default" rule on the
question of satisfaction of the underlying limit and that an excess insur-
ance policy could perhaps be drafted to avoid the Zeig rule.3 9 Excess in-
surers began to insert such anti-Zeig clauses into their policies and
began to have success enforcing such provisions.40 This development
was praised by insurer counsel as a victory for enforcement of contract
language. Predictably, policyholder counsel disliked this development.
C. The Issue Comes to the Surface as the American Law Institute
Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance Accepts Zeig as a
Default Rule but over Some Objection Endorses Cases Favoring
Enforcement ofAnti-Zeig Clauses
In its Tentative Draft No. 1 of the Restatement of the Law of Liability
Insurance, the American Law Institute (ALI) essentially embraced case
law supporting application of anti-Zeig language in excess insurance pol-
icies. Although endorsing Zeig as a default rule, the ALI took the position
39. See Zeig, 23 F. 2d at 666 (applying general federal common law) (case decided prior to
Erie v. Tompkins) ("A result harmful to the insured, and of no rational advantage to the in-
surer, ought only to be reached when the terms of the contract demand it."). Excess insurers
were not generally required pursuant to Zeig to "drop down" and provide coverage in the
event of the insolvency of an underlying insurer absent specific policy language. See, e.g., Zu-
rich Ins. Co. v. Heil Co., 815 F.2d 1122, 1124 (7th Cir. 1987); New Process Baking Co. v.
Fed. Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 62, 63 (7th Cir. 1991). However, if the underlying insurer's limits
were paid by the policyholder and relevant excess insurance did not contain a "payment
by insurer only" clause, Zeig was generally interpreted to permit policyholders to fill the
gap created when an insurer became insolvent.
40. See, e.g., Martin Res. Mgmt. Corp. v. Axis Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18279 (5th
Cir. Oct. 21, 2015) (applying Texas law) (discussed further at text accompanying notes 71-
85, infra); Citigroup Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 367, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying Texas
law) (policyholder's settlement with underlying insurer for less than full limit of policy pre-
cludes attachment of excess insurance where excess policy required that underlying insurers
"have paid in cash the full amount of their respective liabilities"); Comerica Inc. v. Zurich
Am. Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1032 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (applying Michigan law); Qual-
comm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App.
2008). But see Title Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14675 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that where excess policy speaks of underlying limit becom-
ing "payable" rather than paid, Qualcomm does not control and case is subject to Zeig ap-
proach); see also Ali v. Fed. Ins. Co., 719 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying New York
law) (where excess policy provides for attachment "only after all" underlying insurance
"has been exhausted by payment of claim(s)" or exhaustion "solely as a result of payment
of losses thereunder," actual payment is required; excess policies are not triggered unless
there has been "actual payment of losses" rather than "the mere accrual of losses in the
form of liability"; actual payment required but not necessarily by underlying insurers);
Fed. Ins. Co. v. Srivastava, 2 F.3d 98 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying Texas law) (enforcing excess
policy term requiring actual payment to satisfy underlying limit, but that did not specify
identity of payer where policyholder settled below policy limits and apparently did not fill
the gap between settlement amount and excess insurance attachment point).
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that the Zeig approach does not apply if "otherwise stated in the policy." 4 1
Although embracing Zeig as a default approach, the Reporters and Coun-
cil 42 accepted the excess insurer argument that an excess insurer could
avoid Zeig and insist that underlying limits and their attachment points
be satisfied only if an underlying insurer was the entity paying the under-
lying limit. Draft § 40 thus approved of the results in Comerica and Qual-
comm, two prominent cases enforcing payment-only-by-underlying-insurer
clauses and setting forth in some detail the case for their application. 43
In response, some members of the Institute proposed that the section
be amended so that the first paragraph would read: "When an insured is
covered by an insurance policy that provides coverage that is excess to an
underlying insurance policy, the following rules apply, unless othe ris
stated in the insurane policy,unless a term in the excess policy
that was specifically negotiated by the parties has a plain meaning to
41. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 40 states:
§ 40. Excess Insurance: Exhaustion and Drop Down
When an insured is covered by an insurance policy that provides coverage that is excess to
an underlying insurance policy, the following rules apply, unless otherwise stated in the
policy.
(1) The excess insurer is not obligated to provide benefits under its policy until the
underlying policy is exhausted.
(2) The underlying policy is exhausted when an amount equal to the limit of that policy
has been paid to claimants for a covered loss, or for other covered benefits subject to
that limit, by or on behalf of the underlying insurer or the insured.
(3) If the underlying insurer is unable to perform, whether because of insolvency or oth-
erwise, the excess insurer is not obligated to provide coverage in the place of the un-
derlying insurer.
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 40 (Proposed Final Draft) (Am. LAW
INST. Mar. 28, 2017).
42. The ALI has a membership of roughly 3,000 voting members who give final approval
to Restatements by vote at its Annual Meeting held in May of each year. But primary admin-
istration of the Institute is by its Council (a group of between forty-two and sixty-five and the
director, executive director, and staff), which oversees projects such as the Restatements. Re-
statements are launched when approved by the Council, which in turn selects Reporters who
do the primary research, analysis, and drafting of the Restatements. Drafts are reviewed by a
selected group of Advisers as well as by any Member who volunteers to serve on the Mem-
bers Consultative Group for that particular Restatement. Nonmembers following develop-
ments may, of course, also comment. The process of producing a Restatement generally re-
quires a minimum of four years, but often takes longer.
43. See Cometica Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019; Qualcomm, Inc., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770. Cometica
and Qualcomm embraced enforcement of anti-Zeig clauses based on the view that specific ex-
cess policy language reflects a valid insurer concern that without payment by the underlying
insurer, the excess insurer is exposed to unnecessary risk that claims will not be adequately
vetted and negotiated and that policy language should be allowed to displace the default rule
of indifference of the identity or even the payment of the underlying liability.
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the contrary.4 4 Proponents of the Amendment argued that the Zeig de-
fault rule should not be too easily displaced by mere form or boilerplate
language often buried in policy forms without the knowledge of the pur-
chasing policyholder and that there is seldom any specific or express dis-
cussion about the issue of policyholder payments to fill the gap between
underlying insurer payments and the attachment point of an excess policy.
Proponents of the amendment noted that most "disputes settle and most
settlements are compromises." 45
The proponents further argued that to permit an insurer to further
bury an unexpected forfeiture of coverage in the boilerplate of excess pol-
icy forms would be inconsistent with the overall principles and approach
of the Restatement 46 and that the "unless otherwise stated in the policy"
language in the draft would permit the excess insurer to evade coverage
based solely on its ability to insert an unreasonably favorable anti-Zeig
clause into its policy and escape all coverage responsibility.47 Amendment
proponents set out a further brief on the issue, contending that it was un-
fair to permit the excess insurer to avoid coverage based on an anti-Zeig
clause unless it was specifically negotiated and agreed to by the policy-
holder and the excess insurer-and unless the excess insurer could
prove it would be unfairly prejudiced if the insurer-must-be-the-one-to-
pay language was not enforced as written. 48
44. See Proposed Amendment to the excess attachment section of the Restatement (on file
with author and available to ALI Members at ali.org) (boldface removed) (presented at 2016
ALI Annual Meeting).
45. Id.
46. See id. The amendment proponents contended that the Section's approval of blanket
enforcement of anti-Zeig language was problematic in that
* It violates the principle of avoiding disproportionate forfeiture, as embodied both in this
draft Restatement (see, e.g., § 30 cmt. e; § 37 cmt. b) and in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts (see, e.g., § 229);
* It potentially provides unfair windfalls to excess insurers by allowing them to avoid the
substance of their contractual obligations;
* It constitutes a trap for unwary policyholders that may overlook boilerplate excess policy
provisions (which may not be clear until adjudicated), stating that only payments by an
underlying insurer (as contrasted to payments by the policyholder alone or in combina-
tion with an underlying insurer) can be used to reach the attachment point of the excess
insurance;
* It impedes settlement of the underlying claims otherwise covered by the excess liability
insurance as well as settlement of insurance disputes;
* It will likely burden courts with increased litigation; and
* It fails to vindicate the risk management function of excess insurance.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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The Proposed Amendment was presented to the 2016 ALI Annual
Meeting during its May 16 session and was defeated in a show of hands
vote that was sufficiently clear that the exact votes on each side were not
tallied, the margin perhaps as great as a three-to-one. 4 9 When the Restate-
ment becomes finally approved (most likely at the ALI's May 2018 annual
meeting), this will clearly be a benefit to excess insurers, who, as a matter of
course, insert into their policies language requiring that the underlying
limit can be satisfied only by payments made by an underlying insurer.
IV. THE ERROR OF RELENTLESS LITERAL APPLICATION OF
ANTI-ZEIG POLICY LANGUAGE
A. Illustrating the Difference Between the Zeig Approach and the
Qualcomm/ALI Approach
In the wake of the ALI's current version of the Liability Insurance Restate-
ment, what might be termed the Qualcomm/Comerica approach (after the
two leading cases supporting excess insurers on this issue)50 has been ascen-
49. As the chief proponent of the defeated amendment, I was on the floor at the time of
the vote. Although this is what political commentators might call a landslide, a few factors
may have made the vote more lopsided than the actual sentiment of the legal profession.
The motion was the last one discussed during the time allotted for presentation of the
draft Restatement. It was heard, debated, and voted upon at roughly 5:15 p.m. By that
time of day, many members had left and many of those in attendance were lawyers affiliated
with the insurance industry who were undoubtedly continuing to attend the session because
of their particular interest in the issue (as might have been the case with some policyholder
lawyers as well, of course).
A more important factor is that the ALI membership has a strong tradition of generally
backing any draft that has reached the floor because it represents the thoughtful work of
the Reporters, aided by Advisers and a Members Consultative Group, which has then
been approved by the Council. The Council might be described as an elite executive com-
mittee that has a reputation for giving close scrutiny to all ALI projects. Consequently,
the general membership is reluctant to support an amendment at this stage of the proceed-
ings. During the May 16 session, twelve other amendments were proposed and defeated.
Consequently, the clear rejection of the proposed change may not reflect overall legal opin-
ion so strongly as to doom policyholders in future litigation.
50. See Comerica Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (E.D. Mich. 2007);
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App.
2008). Although Comerica is a federal case, I regard Qualcomm as the lead anti-Zeig case. In
addition to containing a more extensive discussion of the issue, Qualcomm has stronger pre-
cedential effect. Pursuant to California custom and practice, the decision of a single Court of
Appeal panel on an issue is binding on trial courts throughout the state and generally con-
sidered binding upon subsequent appellate panels throughout the state and within the same
district unless it is displaced by a subsequent California Supreme Court decision, is viewed as
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, or is in conflict with another appellate decision.
See Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455; 369 P.2d 937, 939-40 (1962)
(most frequently cited case in state regarding stare decisis) ("Decisions of every division of
the District Courts of Appeal are binding upon all the justice and municipal courts and
upon all the superior courts of this state. . . ."); Cal. Rule of Court 8.115 and Commentary;
Apple Valley Unified School Dist. v. Vavrinek, Trine, Day & Co., LLP, 98 Cal. App. 4th
938, 947 (2002); Opsal v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1197, 1203-04
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dent during the past twenty years. Although cases continue to support Zeig,
this has largely been a default rule (similar to the ALI approach) in cases
where courts have found the excess insurer's exhaustion language to be in-
sufficiently clear to overcome the Zeig presumption.5 1 Where policy lan-
guage is unclear, of course, it is construed against the drafter (almost always
the insurer) absent persuasive extrinsic evidence to the contrary. 52 Perhaps
reflecting some uneasiness about allowing excess insurers to contract
around the Zeig approach, some of these courts have arguably strained to
find the attempted payment-must-be-by-underlying-insurer language suffi-
ciently ambiguous to invoke the Zeig approach.5
For variety of reasons, some echoing the arguments of the proponents
of the unsuccessful ALI amendment, a strictly formal and textual ap-
proach to the issue of exhaustion and attachment is unwise. A few simple
illustrations reflect the perniciousness of judicial slavishness to even a
clearly worded anti-Zeig clause.
(1991). But see Marriage of Shaban, 88 Cal. App. 4th 398, 409 (2001) (custom of horizontal
stare decisis is not rigidly applicable to panels of the same court and later panels are not
strictly prohibited from disagreeing with a prior panel's decision); Sears v. Morrison, 90
Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 534 (Ct. App. 1999) (where there is conflict between appellate court de-
cisions, the "trial court may choose the decision it finds most persuasive"). Much to my sur-
prise, there has not been much resistance to Qualcomm by other appellate panels. Based on
the expressed views of insurance coverage counsel in the state, Qualcomm and its strict en-
forcement of anti-Zeig language appears to be treated throughout the state as binding law
("from Mexico to the Oregon border," as one policyholder lawyer described it). In addition
to having such intrastate deference, Qualcomm has been more extensively cited by courts and
secondary sources (141 times) than Coimerica (85 times) as of December 20, 2016.
51. See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. Tokyo Marine & Nichido Fire Ins. Co., Ltd., 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59635, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("In the absence of unambiguous language
requiring exhaustion via full payment of the underlying policy, no such exhaustion is re-
quired" and applying Zeig where policy appeared not to have any anti-Zeig language);
Title Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14675 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 1, 2010) (finding it insufficient to overcome Zeig where policy language provided
for attachment "if such loss is properly payable [under the primary policy], or would be, ex-
cept for exhaustion of the Underlying insurance. . ."); In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 393 B.R. 337
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2008) (finding that requirement of "payment" of underlying limits could
mean either payment in cash or "satisfied" and resolving issue against insurer after consider-
ation of extrinsic evidence). But see Ali v. Fed. Ins. Co., 719 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2013) (ap-
plying New York law) (giving effect to anti-Zeig clause that stated that excess policy "shall
attach only after all such Underlying Insurance has been exhausted . . . solely as a result
of payment of losses thereunder").
52. See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1, § 4.08; STEMPEL, SWISHER & KNUTSEN, supra
note 3, §§ 2.01-2.11.
53. See Maximus, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32970 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 12, 2012) (finding insufficient clarity in anti-Zeig clause that required "actual payment
of the policy limit by the insurance carrier"); Pereira v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 49263 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2006) (clause providing for attachment after "the un-
derlying insurance policies have been exhausted by actual payment" does not clearly bar cov-
erage where there is actual payment of underlying limits by entity other than underlying
insurer).
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1. Illustration No. 1: The Insolvent Underlying Insurer
Consider a claim by the estate of a decedent who died from carbon mon-
oxide (CO) poisoning due to a defective furnace installation. The dece-
dent was a thirty-eight-year-old partner in a profitable investment bank-
ing firm. Investigation quickly confirms that the furnace was negligently
installed. The furnace installer, a small local business, has $1 million of
primary general liability insurance for each occurrence as well as an excess
policy paying $5 million on top of the primary policy limits.
The policyholder defendant tenders the claim to the primary insurer
and notifies the excess insurer. But the primary insurer is insolvent and
the excess insurer refuses to assume the duty to defend, noting that its pol-
icy covers defense expenditures as part of the policyholder's "ultimate net
loss" but does not require a defense. Although the policy provides that the
excess insurer may become involved in defending the claim (something
that would ordinarily be prudent for the excess insurer if the primary in-
surer were not defending), the excess insurer declines-for problematic
reasons that will become clear in a moment.
Left without an insurer-provided defense, the furnace maker retains
counsel at its own expense, incurring $150,000 in defense costs in the
matter. Plaintiff's counsel builds a strong case during discovery. Without
participation by a liability insurer, the furnace maker lacks sufficient funds
to settle the case in view of the likely range of damages awards. Trial en-
sues, resulting in a verdict of $10 million. Faced with this $10 million
(plus prejudgment interest) judgment, the only option for the furnace
maker is a Chapter 7 bankruptcy unless the excess insurer concedes cov-
erage and attempts to persuade the plaintiff to accept 50 cents on the dol-
lar in settlement. If the excess insurer continues to deny coverage or fails
in seeking settlement, the policyholder/defendant/furnace maker must at-
tempt to settle through an assignment of its rights under the excess policy
(the primary policy being essentially worthless) 54 to the plaintiff, perhaps
with a covenant not to execute and perhaps with some cash payment from
the policyholder.
If no such arrangement can be made, the plaintiff can attempt to collect
either from the debtor's estate or directly from the solvent excess insurer.
Although there are occasional exceptions, most courts treat a liability in-
surance policy as outside the bankrupt debtor's estate on the ground that a
tortfeasor/debtor's victim is an intended beneficiary of the liability policy
54. Subject to the possibility that the policyholder might obtain some coverage payment
through the relevant state's insurance guarantee fund. See MARK S. DORFMAN & DAVID A.
CATHER, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT & INSURANCE 153-54 (10th ed. 2013);
VAUGHN & VAUGHN, supra note 1, at 101. However, guarantee funds often have limits
below the policy limits of the insurance being guaranteed or these funds may apply only
to consumer policies rather than commercial policies.
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and that the benefit of the policy should not be diluted by being included
in the debtor's estate where it will be subject to the claims of other cred-
itors. 5 If one substitutes a larger commercial entity for the small business
furnace maker, the policyholder/defendant may be able to come up with
the $1 million that otherwise would have been provided by the insolvent
primary insurer.
Under any of these variants, there is no possibility that the first million
of payments to the decedent's estate will come from a liability insurer. If
the Zeig approach is applied to this situation, the result is not optimal
compensation (the plaintiff's judgment, presumably based on a fair trial
and a reasonable jury verdict, is only partially paid). But taking Zeig's sen-
sible approach at least makes the outcome sufferable in terms of compen-
sation, risk management, and socioeconomic policy.56
The plaintiff will not obtain the full $10 million judgment, at least in the
case of the relatively poor small business that lacks the resources to pay $5
million more of its own funds (the $1 million gap because of the insolvent
primary insurer and the amount of the judgment exceeding its $6 million of
liability insurance-as well as interest on the award). The defendant may be
driven to bankruptcy. But if the plaintiff or policyholder can demonstrate
that the plaintiff suffered covered injury in an amount exceeding the
tower of liability insurance, the excess insurer (and any higher-level excess
insurers had there been a higher tower) will at least provide the compensa-
tion that the small business tortfeasor was unable to provide.
Recall that Zeig provides that the tortfeasor/policyholder/defendant need
not have actually filled a gap in coverage with its own money as long as it
can demonstrate that the amount of liability reaches an excess insurer's at-
tachment point. In the instant illustration, this is easily done because there
is a valid judgment well in excess of the excess insurer's attachment point.
But if the excess policy contains an anti-Zeig clause, with the court in
turn subjecting this illustration to the Qualcomm/ALI approach, the result
is disappointing and arguably absurd. Even though it is clear that the pol-
icyholder has a legitimate liability (it has been adjudicated by a presum-
ably competent court) well in excess of the excess insurer's attachment
point and policy limits, the excess insurer pays nothing toward the judg-
ment. In this example, the excess insurer not only avoided payment on the
55. See Barry Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds in Bankruptcy, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 373, 386-87
(1989).
56. I am taking the (I hope not controversial) position that injured victims (or their estates
and survivors) should be fully compensated for their injuries. Insurance serves a vital, argu-
ably essential function in achieving this goal in that most tortfeasors would, without insur-
ance, lack the resources to fully compensate victims. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABIL-
ITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 39-40
(2008); see generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010).
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judgment but-by gambling that it could get away with denying coverage
altogether (rather than stepping in to protect the policyholder when the
primary insurer was not available to defend)-also avoided paying for
any defense expenditures, even though defense expenditures are part of
the ultimate net loss that was to be covered by the policy.
Talk about a windfall! The excess insurer that collected premiums, per-
haps for years or even decades (small businesses, like individuals, are less
likely to shop for lower premiums and change insurers frequently),s7 is
under the Qualcomm approach permitted to retain those premium dollars
and accumulated investment income even though the policyholder clearly
has been subjected to a covered liability of a magnitude far greater than
the policy's attachment point. The result is at least troubling and perhaps
better described as ridiculous or absurd.
And it is certainly a large-indeed, a complete-forfeiture of the con-
tract rights of the policyholder. Taking a hyper-formalist view, one can
say, of course, that the excess policy's anti-Zeig clause has been breached
or the condition it establishes is unmet. But even if this type of formalistic
analysis, which was purportedly rejected more than thirty years ago in the
Restatement of Contracts,ss is correct, the Qualcomm consequences of this
57. Insurers realize that many customers tend to renew existing coverage without much
thought or recoil in the face of modest but steady price increases and now have the technol-
ogy to predict which policyholders are most subject to such "price optimization" during the
renewal process. Some insurance departments prohibit the practice, but it nonetheless pre-
sents insurers an opportunity to increase profits through charging different customers differ-
ent premiums for policies presenting similar risks. On price optimization, see generally An-
drea Wells, The Price of Price Optimization, INs. J. (Nov. 17, 2015), www.insurancejournal.
com/news/national/2015/11/17/389153.htm.
58. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is largely viewed as functionalist or instru-
mentalist and not strictly formalist in that the Restatement, although generally favoring ap-
plication of plain meaning of text, does not relentlessly apply text in derogation of the overall
purpose of a contract and party intent and departs from earlier contract formalism in a num-
ber of ways. For example, the Contracts Restatement (1) permits the establishment of con-
tract by detrimental reliance and promissory estoppel (§ 90); (2) modifies traditional com-
mon law rules on the contract-forming effect of part performance (§ 45); (3) moves away
from the prior distinctions between conditions precedent and subsequent and unilateral
and bilateral contracts; (4) expressly approves of judicial disregard of contract text on
grounds of unconscionability (§ 208) and public policy (§ 178); (5) establishes a preference
for construction of contracts that favors the public (§ 207); and (6) imposes an obligation
of good faith and fair dealing on contracting parties (§ 205). See RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 40 (Proposed Final Draft) (Am. LAW INST. Mar. 28, 2017),
discussing examples of judicial refusal to give literal enforcement to text. This functionalist
approach is also reflected in the ALI's expressed conception of the nature and role of Re-
statements. See ALI COUNCIL, REVISED STYLE MANUAL (Jan. 2015), available at ali.org:
A Restatement thus assumes the perspective of a common-law court, attentive to and re-
spectful of precedent, but not bound by precedent that is inappropriate or inconsistent
with the law as a whole. . . . A significant contribution of the Restatements has also
been anticipation of the direction in which the law is tending and expression of that devel-
opment in a manner consistent with previously established principles.
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"breach" or "failure of condition" are far too devastating to impose on the
policyholder-particularly when the lack of full payment by the underly-
ing insurer was not the result of any conduct by the policyholder.
Even if a Qualcomm treatment of this matter is consistent with the text
of the excess insurance policy, it is rather clearly inconsistent with the in-
tent, purpose, and function of the policy and the deal made by the policy-
holder and the excess insurer-which was to provide additional liability
insurance when the primary insurance ran out or was exceeded. As dis-
cussed at greater length below, it is erroneous and dangerous for courts
to focus on language alone, even quite clear language, as providing a de-
finitive and conclusive assessment of the meaning of the contract.
Here, the excess policy was designed, of course, to provide additional
liability insurance for big claims. The insurer added an anti-Zeig clause
to provide some greater assurance that its attachment point would not
be reached too easily in cases where the underlying insurer did not pro-
vide the defense, attempted settlement, and grudging payment thought
to better protect the excess insurer. Although this may be a perfectly le-
gitimate goal for excess insurers, making any noncompliance with the tex-
tual provision grounds for complete abrogation of contract duties is sim-
ply too great a penalty-particularly in cases such as Illustration No. 1
where the bona fides of the claim are clear.
Further, although the anti-Zeig clause may reflect a legitimate excess
insurer concern, in many cases, it will not have been one specifically ne-
gotiated or even discussed by policyholder and insurer. The policyholder
will often have been unaware of the provision both at the time the excess
insurance is purchased and at the time of loss. Written insurance policies
are usually not provided to policyholders until weeks or months after the
policy is purchased.5 9 Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that
The Restatement process contains four principal elements. The first is to ascertain the na-
ture of the majority rule. If most courts faced with an issue have resolved it in a particular
way, that is obviously important to the inquiry. The second step is to ascertain trends in
the law. If 30 jurisdictions have gone one way, but the 20 jurisdictions to look at the issue
most recently went the other way, or refined their prior adherence to the majority rule,
that is obviously important as well. Perhaps the majority rule is now widely regarded as
outmoded or undesirable. If Restatements were not to pay attention to trends, the ALI
would be a roadblock to change, rather than a "law reform" organization. A third step
is to determine what specific rule fits best with the broader body of law and therefore
leads to more coherence in the law. And the fourth step is to ascertain the relative desir-
ability of competing rules. Here social-science evidence and empirical analysis can be
helpful.
59. Support for the text proposition that policies often are not issued in writing until con-
siderably after sale: see Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Aftermath of September 11: Myriad
Claims, Multiple Lines, Arguments over Occurrence Counting, War Risk Exclusions, the Future of
Terrorism Coverage, and New Issues of Government Role, 37 TORT & INs. L.J. 817 (2002) (noting
that even though a package of property and liability insurance policies covering the World
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policyholders (and their agents) often do not read the policies closely
when they arrive in the mail months later. In this environment, excess in-
surers can include text in an excess policy that not only was not within the
contemplation of the policyholder but may even be contrary to the under-
standing of the policyholder. The Quacomm approach of giving great cre-
dence to such clauses regardless of contracting context thus can elevate
the form of policy text above both the substance of contracting intent
or the purpose of the instrument.
In addition, the Qua/comm approach to this insolvency illustration im-
poses substantial costs on society. As a result of the excess insurer's clever
decision to add anti-Zeig language to the policy, the victim of a tortfeasor
of modest means is grossly undercompensated for serious injury and even
death. Because the victim in this illustration is a presumably fairly wealthy
investment banker (who did not have dependents and probably had sub-
stantial assets as well as first-party life insurance), the illustration is not
particularly heart-rending. But substitute a thirty-eight-year-old plumber,
electrician, carpenter, manager, teacher, police officer, fire fighter, or so-
cial worker with a spouse and three young children. The value of the life
negligently snuffed out then will not reach investment banker heights (at
least as measured by the judicial system) but certainly exceeds the attach-
ment point of the excess policy and probably the policy limits as well. And
in this case, the spouse (even if a decent wage-earner) and children clearly
have lost much economically-losses that will not be recouped from a
small business tortfeasor without liability insurance.
In turn, some of the economic costs will be absorbed by social service
agencies-making taxpayers provide the compensation that should have
come from the excess insurer. Taxpayers and society also will absorb
less readily quantified costs if the spouse and children are forced to
forgo educational opportunities, lose a home, become crime victims (or
criminals), and other detriments that are all more likely if the family can-
not maintain the middle-class life it had prior to the CO poisoning of the
relatively young income-earning spouse.
In this illustration, which presents essentially no danger that the excess
insurer will be forced to attach prematurely in response to a weak or un-
derdefended claim, the Quacomm methodology of slavish and literal ad-
herence to policy text produces an embarrassingly awful result, one I
find absurd, or at least ridiculous and embarrassing in a legal system pur-
portedly based on rational analysis and results. Courts applying what
might be termed the "absurd result" canon of contract and statutory con-
Trade Towers had been sold in July 2001, written policies had still not been issued by the
time of the September 11 attack).
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struction are often unclear about their definitional standard.60 Decisions
have a certain "I know it when I see it" quality." But condemnation of
Qualcomm treatment of Illustration No. 1 is more than consistent with
many judicial decisions defining or finding an absurd result. 62
Under other circumstances, excess insurer concerns about the actual
payment of underlying limits and the identity of the payer may be more
compelling than in Illustration No. 1. Consider the following illustration.
2. Illustration No. 2: Settling a General Liability Claim with an
Underlying Insurer
Assume the same tragic CO poisoning of the thirty-eight-year-old single
investment banker with the same $6 million tower of liability insurance
protection purchased by the small business policyholder. The estate
sues the furnace maker for the defective installation or repair of the fur-
nace that poisoned him. The primary insurer defends but asserts a reser-
vation of rights based on the standard form pollution exclusion in the pol-
icy.63 The claim is in a jurisdiction that has not yet decided the coverage
60. Although the text of an insurance policy or contract is generally considered the most
effective reflection of the parties' agreement and mutual promises, courts will not give literal
enforcement to text where this would produce an "absurd result." See Olguin v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 237 N.W.2d 694 (Wis. 1976); MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205 (Cal.
2003); W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Budrus, 332 N.W.2d 837, 861 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). Insurers
might respond that a clause like that in Qualcomm (excerpted in note 12, supra) that allows
attachment after an underlying insurer has been adjudicated liable could avoid the absurdity.
But this view requires that a policyholder or its assignee incur what appears to be needless
effort, expense, and delay in pursuing a judgment against an insolvent insurer as a prerequi-
site to recovery of excess insurance previously purchased. And many anti-Zeig clauses require
actual payment by the underlying insurer rather than simply determination of payment
responsibility.
61. "I know it when I see it" has become something of a gestalt expression for situations in
which a court or other observer has a strong characterization of a matter that is not readily
described in incremental or definitional terms. It is most associated with Justice Potter Stew-
art's comment regarding his ability to recognize pornography without the need for a precise
definition. SeeJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 174, 197 (1964). What is remembered less often is
his additional conclusion that the material under review "is not it." See id. at 198.
62. See, e.g., Bethke v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 825 N.W.2d 482, 493 (Wis. 2013) (rejecting
insurer's argument that because rental car company was self-insured, rental car could not be
"underinsured" and that UIM coverage was not triggered; "interpreting [the term 'underin-
sured motor vehicle'] to exclude self-insured rental vehicles from coverage leads to an absurd
result here," prompting rejection of the argument); Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2 N.W.2d
576, 581 (Nev. 1942) ("when the strict enforcement of a provision of an insurance policy will
result in unreasonable and unjust forfeitures, or an absurd result, the courts will refuse to
enforce the strict meaning of the language of the policy"); Rathbun v. Globe Indem. Co.,
184 N.W.2d 903, 905 (Neb. 1921) ("construction of the policy should not end in an unrea-
sonable or absurd result and cannot defeat the manifest intention of the parties and the very
object and purpose they had in entering into the contract at all").
63. A typical pollution exclusion contained in a general liability policy states that any
claim "arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migra-
tion, release or escape" of a pollutant falls outside coverage, with "pollutant" defined as
"any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke vapor,
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issue, one on which the courts have differed. 64 The excess policy follows
form to the primary policy.
The situation presents a significant coverage issue, one on which either
insurer or policyholder may prevail. Because the issue is unresolved in the
jurisdiction, the primary insurer (correctly) realizes there is a potential for
coverage and defends the claim pursuant to a reservation of rights.65 Be-
cause the claim presents obvious exposure to a damage award of more
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste," with waste including "materials to be recy-
cled, reconditioned, or reclaimed." See, e.g., Insurance Services Office, Commercial General
Liability Policy CG 00 01 12 07 (2007), reprinted in STEMPEL, SwISHER & KNUTSEN, supra
note 3, app. E.
Because of the lengthy and broad definition of "pollutants" and the sweeping language of
the exclusion, insurers have often successfully argued that the exclusion applies to bar cov-
erage even for liability claims against a policyholder that are ordinarily not regarded as pol-
lution claims. See MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 3, at ch. 15 (state-by-state survey reflects
split of authority but that insurers have often successfully obtained literal application of ex-
clusion). See, e.g., Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 809 N.W.2d 529 (Wis. 2012) (bat
guano in vacation home); Maxine Furs, Inc., v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 426 F. App'x 687
(11th Cir. 2011) (Indian curry aroma that spoiled furs fell into pollution exclusion); Reed
v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 667 S.E.2d 90, 92 (Ga. 2008) (applying exclusion to carbon mon-
oxide leak claim similar to that of Illustration Nos. 1 & 2); Quadrant Corp. v. Am. States Ins.
Co., 110 P.3d 733 (Wash. 2005) (illness to apartment tenant from fumes from deck sealant
due to deck construction); see generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Con-
struing the "Absolute" Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations,
34 TORT & INs. L.J. 1 (1998) (criticizing literal application of text of pollution exclusion to
bar coverage in such cases, noting that drafting history of the exclusion indicates insurance
industry concern over traditional pollution claims such as groundwater contamination or
fouling of air over dispersed area).
64. See MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 3, at ch. 15 (state-by-state survey shows roughly
equal division of states giving literal application to broad CGL policy pollution exclusion
text so as to bar coverage for claims such as carbon monoxide poisoning that involve isolated
exposure of victim to harmful materials because of negligence of policyholder). Roughly
twenty states do not have definitive authority from the state's highest court concerning
the pollution exclusion. See id. (nine states have state intermediate court precedent but not
high court precedent; eight states have federal court decisions making an Erie prediction
but no state high court authority; three states have essentially no on-point authority at
any level). See also id. at ch. 17 (discussing state division over application of qualified pollution
exclusion, which has similarly broad language but restores coverage if the release or dis-
charge of pollutants is "sudden and accidental").
65. Because the duty to defend is based on the facts as alleged by the claimant and is sub-
ject to the potential-for-coverage standard, it is only logical that until the jurisdiction has
controlling precedent on the application of the pollution exclusion that forecloses coverage
for CO poisoning, there exists a potential for coverage. If the primary insurer refused to de-
fend under these circumstances, it would be in breach of the duty to defend, a breach that in
many (but not the majority of) jurisdictions prohibits the primary insurer from contesting
coverage. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Enhancing the Socially Instrumental Role of nsurance: The
Emerging Opportunity Presented by Treatment of the Duty to Defend, 5 U.C.-IRVINE L. REV.
587 (2015).
Until coverage has been clearly foreclosed by unquestionably applicable precedent, the po-
tential for coverage exists and the primary insurer is obligated to defend until it can obtain a
ruling in the case at hand. Any different approach violates the potential for coverage standard
and has the practical effect of unreasonably negating the duty in any circumstances where the
law is unclear.
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than $1 million, the policyholder and the primary insurer notify the excess
insurer.
Despite its reservation of rights, the primary insurer (correctly) realizes
that the claim presents a great potential for a verdict and judgment in ex-
cess of the $1 million policy limits. Recognizing its duty to make reason-
able settlement decisions, realizing that continued defense will be costly,
and concerned that failure to at least attempt settlement will expose it to
bad faith liability, the primary insurer offers its policy limits in settlement.
The claimant rejects a $1 million settlement offer by the primary insurer.
The excess insurer declines to contribute to the settlement offer or other-
wise participate in settlement negotiations with the claimant.
Trial ensues and a verdict of $10 million is rendered. The primary in-
surer and the policyholder resolve their coverage dispute (about whether
CO poisoning deaths of this type are a loss stemming from "pollution"
rather than poisoning caused by a defective repair or product) on a 70/30
basis, with the primary insurer agreeing to provide $700,000 of liability cov-
erage and the policyholder contributing $300,000 from its own funds.66
The policyholder now seeks payment from the excess insurer.
Under these circumstances, it hardly seems that the excess insurer is
harmed by the active defense efforts below and the coverage compromise
between the policyholder and the primary insurer. Although the pollution
exclusion issue is not free from doubt, policyholders have frequently pre-
vailed in situations like confined CO poisoning that are relatively remote
from the environmental contamination that spawned the absolute pollution
exclusion. 7 The 70-30 split coverage compromise is not unreasonable.
Had the primary insurer litigated the issue to conclusion, it might well
have paid $1 million in coverage as well as missing the other benefits of set-
tlement. 68 The settlement certainly appears reasonable and not the product
of any unfair collaboration between primary insurer and policyholder.
66. Settlement on these terms is fairly realistic. Although states with significant pollution
exclusion precedent divide roughly in half concerning approaches to the exclusion (textual
literalism that tends to favor insurers vs. a functional, purposive approach to contract that
tends to favor policyholders), the scorecard for CO poisoning cases is somewhat more favor-
able to policyholders. See MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 3, at ch. 15 (of states with cases
involving CO poisoning such as that set forth in the Illustration, ten states find CO poison-
ing outside pollution exclusion while three states find CO poisoning within pollution
exclusion).
67. See, e.g., Century Sur. Co. v. Casino W., Inc., 329 P.3d 614 (Nev. 2014) (carbon mon-
oxide claim against hotel not barred by pollution exclusion); MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch.,
73 P.3d 1205 (Cal. 2003) (same).
68. Presumably, the settlement extinguished any continued defense obligation of the pri-
mary insurer as well as relieving the primary carrier from paying pre- or post-judgment in-
terest or possibly even the policyholder's counsel fees incurred in litigating the coverage
issue.
837
838 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal, Spring/Summer 2017 (52:3)
Perhaps more important, it does not preclude the excess insurer from
litigating or compromising the pollution exclusion coverage issue. If the
excess insurer successfully rolls the dice, it may escape coverage liability
on the merits (e.g., a judicial determination that CO poisoning qualifies
as excluded pollution liability). But if the court finds to the contrary,
the excess insurer must do what it contracted to do-pay defense costs
and judgment/settlement liability for this claim that pretty clearly is one
worth more than the primary policy's limits of $1 million.
But pursuant to the Qualcomm/ALI position, an excess insurer with an
anti-Zeig clause never faces the merits of the pollution exclusion or other
substantive coverage issues. The excess insurer simply skates away from
its promised excess coverage because the policyholder compromised a
coverage dispute with the primary insurer. This approach results in a massive
forfeiture of purchased coverage, reduced compensation to the victim(s),
and undermining of socioeconomic policy that should give pause to legal
policymakers.
3. Illustration No. 3: Settling a D&O Claim-The Martin Resource
Case as a Troubling Example of the Qualcomm/ALI Approach
A similarly troubling illustration drawn from actual litigation is Martin Re-
source Management Corp. v. Axis Insurance Co.,6 9 which exhibits a Qualcomm-
like literal approach to the issue that fails to even ask whether the policy
text in question was really understood and agreed to by the policyholder
or whether strict enforcement of the text runs counter to other important
legal norms.70
Policyholder Martin Resource purchased $10 million of directors & of-
ficers insurance from Zurich, $10 million of first-layer excess insurance
from AXIS, and $10 million of second-layer excess insurance from Arch.
Plaintiffs filed a stock-dilution claim against Martin, which sought coverage
from its insurers, who disputed coverage, requiring Martin to defend the
claim while simultaneously suing its insurers to obtain coverage.71
Zurich and Martin compromised their coverage dispute, with Zurich
paying $6 million (60 percent, which suggests something more than a nui-
sance or customer accommodation settlement) and Martin paying at least
an additional $4 million (at least as I read the court's description that does
69. 803 F.3d 766 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying Texas law).
70. Some of this may be a result of the manner in which the case was litigated, in which
the policyholder's primary argument appears to be that the payment-only-by-insurer lan-
guage was sufficiently ambiguous to provide the policyholder with the benefit of contra pro-
ferentem or use of the Zeig default rule. See id. at 773, n.8 (policyholder did "not contend
that an excess-insurance contract that unambiguously precludes exhaustion by below-limits
settlements violates Texas's public policy").
71. The court's opinion does not state the amount of defense costs expended by Martin
Resources.
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not give exact figures). Martin then sought coverage from its excess insur-
ers, arguing that their attachment points had been met by this $10 million
in payments (which suggests that Martin paid more than $14 million de-
fending the stock dilution claim, an amount that when combined with
Zurich's $6 million payment would be sufficient to reach Arch's attach-
ment point of $20 million).
Arch, the second-layer excess insurer with a $20 million attachment
point, settled with Martin. But AXIS, despite having a lower $10 million
attachment point, successfully avoided paying even a dollar in coverage
because its policy contained language stating
The Insurance afforded under this Policy shall apply only after all applicable
Underlying Insurance has been exhausted by actual payment under such Un-
derlying Insurance, and shall only pay excess of any retention or deductible
amounts provided in the Primary [Zurich] Policy and other exhausted Un-
derlying Insurance. 72
The Martin Resource court found this language clear and unambiguous
and enforced it literally even though policyholder Martin was not asking
excess insurer AXIS to provide coverage until after $10 million had been
paid in apparently vigorous defense of the litigation. The court's ratio-
nale, which can be defended on neoclassical contract textual grounds, is
nonetheless troubling in its almost religious attitude toward insurance
policy text, which may be boilerplate contained in a document that arrived
weeks or months after the risk was placed and may not have been read or
appreciated by even a relatively experienced policyholder or broker.7 3
Throughout the opinion, the Fifth Circuit, perhaps constrained by
Texas law, takes the view that satisfaction of the underlying limit by a
"gap" payment from the policyholder is "not a reasonable interpretation
of the contract" because policy text requires that the underlying limit
be paid by the underlying insurer(s) with no gap payments. 74
But as discussed below, the Fifth Circuit/Texas approach errs in stead-
fastly equating every term or word on the face of the policy with "the con-
tract." The contract is better viewed as the overall agreement and not sim-
72. Martin Res., 803 F.3d at 769.
73. It has become fashionable to say that it is broker malpractice to fail to notice "only
insurer payment counts" clauses and to discuss them with the policyholder before agreeing
or refusing to agree. Absent special circumstances (e.g., insurers may have hidden the clause
or been deceptive about inserting it into a policy; other contextual factors that may excuse
the broker), I generally agree but see a policyholder suit against the broker (and its errors &
omissions policy) as an inadequate solution for failing to require an excess insurer to provide
promised coverage as long as the excess insurer is not actually harmed by the identity of the
entity that pays an underlying limit.
74. See Martin Res., 803 F.3d at 770. The Martin Resource court read Texas law as man-
dating that the anti-Zeig language of the AXIS policy be strictly enforced. Whether this is
a correct or required reading of Texas law is beyond the scope of this article.
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ply the text of the policy that represents a memorialization of the insuring
agreement.7 5 To be sure, the particulars of this overall agreement are gen-
erally summarized in the policy text. Not every aspect of the contract can
be discussed or negotiated. But neither can the text fully address all aspects
of the contract, such as industry custom and practice and effectuation of the
purpose of the contract. Literal enforcement of policy text might even run
counter to those values and undermine the basic purpose of the contract-
and the basic agreement and understanding of the parties.
The court then goes into a textual assessment of other policy language
that supports its view that "all" means "all" and should be given its literal
meaning without regard to whether satisfaction of the underlying limit
through payment by Zurich and Martin Resource ($6 million + $4 million
(or more) equals $10 million), which is the amount of the underlying limit.
This portion of the opinion reads at times like a classic English opin-
ion, slicing and dicing words on a page without much, if any, reflection
concerning the underlying business arrangement memorialized by the
words on the page.7 6 The court never once addresses the issue of whether
an excess policy fails of its essential purpose if 100 percent of promised
coverage is lost because the policyholder settled a coverage dispute with
the underlying insurer.
With the wisdom of hindsight, the policyholder's conduct may have
been unwise or even foolish. But is it sufficiently blameworthy to give
the excess insurer the windfall of avoiding coverage even though the
claim at issue reached its attachment point? Giving payment-only-by-
underlying-insurer language such sweepingly literal effect converts the
term into a super-exclusion even though the excess insurer is not being
asked to do anything inconsistent with the insuring agreement of the pol-
icy (in a case that seems to have been vigorously defended).77
75. See text accompanying notes 131-40.
76. See Martin Res., 803 F.3d at 770:
With regard to the amount that must be paid, it is unreasonable to construe the AXIS pol-
icy to allow exhaustion by a below-limit settlement. The AXIS policy requires "actual pay-
ment" of "all applicable Underlying Insurance." The AXIS policy defines "Underlying In-
surance" as the policies stated in the endorsement section [which] only contains the Zurich
policy.... The word "all" makes clear that, under the AXIS policy, a settlement does not
exhaust the Zurich policy when it is for less than the limit of liability.
See also id. at 772 (treating the reader to exposition on the finer points of the meaning of
terms such as "exhausted by actual payment," "wholly exhausted solely due to actual pay-
ment," "wholly exhausted," and "partially reduced" as well as "all").
77. To be fair to the Martin Resource court, it was apparently constrained by Texas con-
tract law, although it seemed to accept these constraints without regret. See id. at 768. Fed-
eral courts are, of course, bound by Erie to follow state contract precedent, even if they dis-
like it. See, e.g., Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988)
(grudgingly applying California law).
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Unfortunately, this approach to contract construction places too much
emphasis on text-which is but a memorialization of the agreement and
objective of the contract-and too little on the purpose and function of
an insurance policy. Even for business insurance involving brokers and
counsel, it is far from clear that every word of a policy represents "written
expression of the parties' intent." It is not infrequent for one or more of
the parties to have no familiarity with some terms of the policy, let alone
any understanding or concept of all policy terms.
A more common phrasing of contract law than quoted in Martin Re-
source is that courts should give effect to the intent of the parties, which
is usually best indicated by the text of the contract documents. 8 To be
sure, unambiguous policy language is normally given its clear facial mean-
ing. Even in jurisdictions like California that are less formalist than Texas,
language must be reasonably susceptible to the meaning proffered by the
party seeking to present intrinsic evidence of meaning.79 Despite this def-
erence for text, however, courts frequently refuse to give literal effect to
text that thwarts contract and public policy objectives and is inconsistent
with party intent and the purpose of the instrument.80
The Martin Resource decision-however troubling in its tunnel vision-
is not necessarily incorrect as a matter of neoclassical formalist contract
law. What is disturbing is that the decision fails to even consider the op-
eration of liability insurance and its socioeconomic role in risk manage-
ment. And, of course, the court does not address questions of dispropor-
tionate forfeiture, undue windfalls to a contract party, public policy, or-
perhaps most important-areas where insurance doctrine has declined to
give literal interpretation to even the most unambiguous of policy terms
because to do so runs counter to other important facets of insurance law.
Also disturbing is the court's conclusion that "the AXIS policy unam-
biguously precludes exhaustion by below-limit settlement."8 1 The AXIS
language, however clear, says something less than that. More important,
the Fifth Circuit's sweeping pronouncement reflects an unwise judicial
view that literal enforcement of problematic policy provisions matters
more than a construction of the policy that serves larger law and policy
goals of efficient dispute resolution and risk management as well as sub-
stantive fairness and avoidance of undue forfeiture. In effect, policyhold-
78. See JOSEPH E. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (6th ed. 2009)
(aim of contract construction is to give effect to party intent, with contract defined as en-
forcement of promises); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.1 (4th ed. 2004) (same).
79. See Trident Ctr., 847 F.2d 564 (bemoaning California's liberal attitude toward extrinsic
evidence but feeling bound to apply pursuant to the Erie Doctrine); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
80. See text accompanying notes 101-75, infra.
81. Martin Res., 803 F.3d at 769.
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ers are punished for settling with an underlying insurer rather than litigat-
ing to the last post-trial motion or appeal. This creates very negative in-
centives for the justice system.
But whatever its faults, the Martin Resource decision is consistent with
the trend of the times in giving literal enforcement to anti-Zeig clauses,
although there are occasionally cases to the contrary.8 2 Final publication
of the ALI Restatement is likely to make the situation worse. Prudent bro-
kers and policyholder counsel therefore must be vigilant regarding such
clauses. And to be fair to excess insurers, less severe versions of such
clauses are often made available to policyholders.8 3
B. The Pernicious Impact ofAutomatic Enforcement ofAnti-Zeig Clauses
These Illustrations reflect considerable problems with the sweeping literal
enforcement of anti-Zeig provisions in excess policies. Under the default
rule of Zeig, the excess insurer's underlying limit would be considered sat-
isfied and its attachment point reached because $1 million has been paid
by a combination of the primary insurer and the insured or will certainly
be paid once the plaintiff executes on the judgment.
And under this regime, although the excess insurance would attach, the
excess insurer in the first two Illustrations would still be able to assert its
pollution exclusion defense to coverage and any other potentially applica-
ble coverage defenses, including any contention that the settlement was
unreasonable or collusive.
Proponents of the Qualcomm approach seem to forget this fact in argu-
ing that it is unfair to deny the excess insurer its anti-Zeig defense. But
strict enforcement of an anti-Zeig clause works a greater unfairness in
that it prevents the excess insurer's obligation from ever being triggered,
82. See, e.g., Maximus, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 856 F. Supp. 2d 797, 801-02 (E.D.
Va. 2012). But Maximus did so on the ground that the policy text was sufficiently ambiguous to
find for the policyholder rather than directly on disproportionate forfeiture or similar policy-
oriented grounds. The Martin Resource court is highly critical of Maximus and may be correct
as a matter of linguistics but that hardly makes Martin Resource prudently decided.
83. For example, one insurer's provision regarding underlying insurance provides that the
underlying limit is satisfied
[i]n the event and only in the event of the reduction or exhaustion of the Underlying Limit
by reason of the insurers of the Underlying Policies and/or the Company and/or the In-
sured Persons paying in legal currency Loss covered under the respective Underlying Pol-
icy as provided [in the policy].
This requirement of payment in legal currency is designed to prevent the attachment of the
excess policy based on mere assignment or forgiveness of claims or other concessions that
might be deemed to have value. An excess insurer reasonably wants to attach only after actual
monetary payment, which ensures that the underlying limit really has been exhausted
through the adversarial dispute resolution process rather than through an "on paper" ar-
rangement between a policyholder and an underlying insurer (perhaps one with far lower
limits than the excess policy at issue) that may give rise to what might be termed a soft
form of collusion that is implicitly unfair to the excess insurer but hard to prove.
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even though it is clear that the amount of the policyholder's liability ex-
ceeds the attachment point. While refusal to enforce the condition does
deprive the excess insurer of a powerful defense, the defense is so powerful
in some situations that it results in a complete forfeiture to the policy-
holder without any proof that the excess insurer was actually harmed by
the lack of the underlying insurer's full payment.
By contrast, under my proposed treatment of anti-Zeig clauses, an ex-
cess insurer that can actually demonstrate that it was damaged by the set-
tlement or the payment of part of the underlying limit by the policyholder
can indeed avoid coverage on grounds of fraud, collusion, or a meritless
complaint and also retain its right to litigate core coverage issues such
as the applicability of a pollution exclusion or other limitation on cover-
age. But it may not escape all liability simply because of the happenstance
of the source of satisfaction of an underlying limit.
Applying a Zeig approach even in the face of clear underlying-insurer-
must-pay language is very similar to the longstanding judicial treatment of
anti-assignment clauses, cooperation clauses, consent-to-settle clauses,
and prompt notice clauses. 84
The Illustrations are relatively simple and straightforward, but they
serve to illuminate the problems created by the Qualcomm approach
through demonstrating how literal application of an anti-Zeig clause can
easily bring pernicious and even absurd results. Excess insurers undoubt-
edly would argue that most real-world cases are not so stark and that re-
quiring underlying insurer payment as a condition precedent to coverage
is not unfair in more complex situations involving multiple parties, con-
secutive policy periods, settlements on the merits rather than full adjudi-
cation, settlements that involve exchanges other than or in addition to
cash, and the like.8 Perhaps.
My response is simply that excess insurers wishing to avoid coverage
because of the particular deficiencies of a settlement, however simple or
complex the context, should be required to defeat coverage on the merits.
If the settlement is a "sweetheart deal" between plaintiff, policyholder, or
underlying insurers, the excess insurer should have to prove it. Fraud, col-
lusion, ex gratia payments, or unreasonable settlement terms or amounts
84. See text accompanying notes 101-75, infra.
85. See, e.g., O'Connor, Caveat Settlor, supra note 16; O'Connor, Rights of Excess Insurers,
supra note 16; Carrie Cope, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London: No
Drop Down Required, Insured's Expectation of Coverage Defeated by Clear Policy Language to the
Contrary, LEXISNEXIs EMERGING ISSUEs ANALYSIS (Apr. 2008) (appearing to take favorable
view of Qualcomm); see also McCarter & English, Addressing the Complications Arising from Cov-
erage Settlements Involving Multiple Insureds and Insurers, and Non-Covered Parties, LEXISNEXIS
EMERGING ISSUEs ANALYSIS (May 2012) (describing cases using both Zeig approach and Qual-
comm approach involving multiple parties, claims, policies, and policy periods as well as non-
cash settlements).
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remain valid defenses for an excess insurer even if it cannot use anti-Zeig
language as a get-out-of-jail-free card. If the consideration given for a set-
tlement is "funny money" (e.g., dismissal of claims without value, credits
for worthless or undesired purchases), this too provides a valid objection
to coverage.
If excess insurers are genuinely concerned that without full payment by
underlying insurers satisfaction of underlying limits is suspect, they
should simply have to prove their suspicions rather than being able to
completely avoid otherwise valid coverage obligations merely because un-
derlying limits were satisfied by a different payer or in another manner
sufficient to demonstrate that the claim in question reached the attach-
ment point.
1. Allowing an Excess Insurer to Avoid Coverage for Judgments or
Settlements Based on the Source of Payment of the Underlying Limit
Runs Counter to the Principle of Avoiding Disproportionate
Forfeiture and Creates Unfair Windfalls for Excess Insurers
The ALI Restatement's embrace of Qualcomm is particularly surprising in
that the Restatement presumably would follow the important axiom that
liability insurance issues should be decided in a manner that avoids dis-
proportionate forfeiture. 6 This is a sound approach enshrined in the
maxim that the "law abhors a forfeiture." 7 Under circumstances such
as those described in the above Illustrations, the loss of insurance policy/con-
tract benefits to the policyholder (or its assignee) is clearly disproportionate
to any "breach" of a condition or term in the policy. Unless the excess insurer
can actually demonstrate harm that it would not have faced had there been
payment of the underlying limit solely by an underlying insurer(s), enforce-
ment of the condition/term merely enriches the excess insurer (by $5 million
under these Illustrations) on the basis of what might be termed a mere tech-
nicality (the identity of a payer or the absence of an underlying insurer due to
insolvency).
The flip side of undue forfeiture visited upon the policyholder (which
paid premiums for the excess insurance) is an unreasonable windfall to the
excess insurer. In underwriting the excess policy, the excess insurer un-
86. In discussion with the Advisors, the Reporters and Professor Abraham expressed sup-
port for a presumption against disproportionate forfeiture in crafting the Restatement. Par-
ticularly noted was an article by Professor Robert Works that made this observation primar-
ily in the context of claims-made insurance. See Robert Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of
Insurance Policy Conditions in Order to Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture: Claims-Made Formats
as a Test Case, 5 CoNN. INs. LJ. 506 (1998). Even if this were not the conscious intent of
the Institute, it is a mainstream legal principle of considerable value.
87. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. ofAm. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1999) (overruled on
other grounds); Hasperv. Ctr. Mut. Ins. Co., 723 N.W.2d 409, 415 (N.D. 2006); Kershaw v.
Kershaw, 848 So. 2d 942, 955 (Ala. 2002).
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doubtedly made actuarial estimates of the likelihood that it would be
faced with claims piercing into its layer of coverage. Under the CO poi-
soning hypotheticals of the Illustrations, this is exactly what happened. Al-
though an event the excess insurer would prefer to have avoided, it was
part of the risk-shifting and risk-distribution arrangement made by insur-
ers selling liability coverage. But due to the mere happenstance of either
underlying insurer insolvency (Illustration No. 1) or a compromised cov-
erage dispute (Illustration Nos. 2 & 3), the excess insurer not only avoids
a claim arguably within coverage (depending on resolution of the pollu-
tion exclusion dispute) but avoids coverage completely, without even
being troubled to litigate its coverage position or prove any harm from
the settlement.
By any reasonable understanding, this is a big windfall88 for the excess
insurer. By permitting an excess insurer to deny the attachment of its cov-
erage based on the happenstance of who pays the underlying limit, Qual-
comm creates myriad opportunities for policyholders to suffer dispropor-
tionate forfeiture. As illustrated above, following a Qualcomm approach
can cause the policyholder to lose millions of dollars of purchased excess
insurance (tens of millions in the case of large commercial towers of cov-
erage), merely because it compromised a coverage dispute with a single
underlying insurer for anything less than 100 cents on the dollar. Under
the Zeig approach, excess insurers are adequately protected from paying
claims at an amount lower than their attachment point as long as the un-
derlying limits are paid. They need no further protection.
If an excess insurer was prepared to pay amounts in excess of the at-
tachment point when it took the policyholder's premium, it should not
be completely relieved of that obligation at the point of claim simply be-
cause some of the underlying amount spent to reach the attachment point
came from a policyholder rather than an underlying insurer-which can
happen equally through settlement by the parties or insolvency of an under-
lying insurer.
2. Anti-Zeig Language as a Trap for the Unwary
Cases like Qualcomm based their decisions on a view that text takes primacy-
even in derogation of the dominant purpose and function of the liability in-
surance contract. These cases also tend to reflect an attitude that commercial
policyholders should be sufficiently sophisticated "big boys" to read both the
printed forms and the negotiated endorsements of their excess policies care-
88. Dictionaries commonly define a windfall as "an unexpected, unearned, or sudden gain
or advantage." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1434 (11th ed. 2003). Legal
dictionaries and precedent have defined a windfall as "An unanticipated benefit ... in the
form of a profit not caused by the recipient." See Windfall, BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1738
(9th ed. 2009).
845
846 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law journal, Spring/Summer 2017 (52:3)
fully, understand the full implications of any "unless otherwise stated" lan-
guage, and either bargain to eliminate it or make other arrangements with
competing insurers. This "caveat policyholder" viewpoint is misplaced for
several reasons.
a. The Realities of Insurance Policy Placement-Expecting the policy-
holder to have encyclopedic knowledge of every term in a policy is unre-
alistic in light of the manner in which insurance is sold. Sophisticated cus-
tomers aided by sufficiently expert brokers and attorneys may be able to
examine policies prior to purchasing and may even specifically negotiate
the text of the policy. But this is not the norm. Typically, insurance is
sold with basic agreement as to a few key terms such as price, retention,
policy period, and premium. But seldom is specific language discussed or
the full policy provided to the insurance applicant for inspection and
analysis.
Courts applying the implicit "caveat policyholder" approach appear
not to appreciate that in the real world, insurance placement proceeds
at a brisk pace that may leave comparatively little opportunity for close
reading of policy language before premiums are paid and coverages are
bound. For example, the policy-with the actual printed form language
contradicting the default Zeig approach-may not be delivered to the pol-
icyholder for months after the insurance is purchased. 89 When it does,
any substantive review is likely to be confined to the endorsements that
the risk manager specifically negotiated and agreed upon, not the printed
form that is commonly assumed to express only the basic form-following
function of the excess coverage.
This is particularly true for individual and small business policyholders.
Their first look at the full text of the policy may not come for weeks or
months. And individuals and small businesses will normally lack the assis-
tance of brokers and counsel in plying the insurance marketplace and re-
viewing purchase options.
The Qualcomm approach (and current § 40 of the ALI Restatement)
makes no distinction between consumer insureds and commercial insureds.
The deference to anti-Zeig clauses applies to individuals (e.g., a middle-class
wage earner with a personal umbrella policy) and small businesses (the hy-
pothetical furnace repair company in Illustration Nos. 1 & 2 above) as well
as to Fortune 500 corporations. Many of the policyholders adversely af-
fected will have no information about anti-Zeig clauses in general or any
anti-Zeig clauses in the policies sent to them long after their purchases.
When they learn-in the context of a coverage denial-it will be too late.
89. See Stempel, Insurance Aftermath of September 11, supra note 59 (policy text regarding
World Trade Center not available at time of September 11 attacks even though policy period
began in July).
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Even sizeable corporations and governments make mistakes and may
miss problematic language in an excess policy. Like consumers, they
often do not receive the final written policy until long after purchase. A
common practice is the issuance of a "certificate of insurance" to a com-
mercial purchaser at the time of sale. This certificate records only the bare
details of the contract. Worse yet, to the extent the certificate tends to es-
tablish coverage, courts refuse to follow the certificate language once the
full policy has been issued. 90
Although contract traditionalists might have little sympathy for policy-
holders and note that there is a "duty to read" the policy91 (when it eventually
arrives), this critique is unrealistic. A policyholder that purchased insurance
weeks ago reasonably presumes that the language of the policy memorializ-
ing the purchase will be in accord with the insurance product purchased-in
this case, excess insurance.92 Further, insurers have fiduciary-like duties to-
ward their policyholders and presumably can be trusted not to issue a policy
with language that undermines any basic purpose of the insurance product. 93
In this environment, one is unlikely to see an ever-vigilant policyholder ea-
gerly ripping open the envelope containing a newly issued policy and pour-
ing over every word in search of landmines that may have been authored by
the insurer.
Expecting super-vigilant-cum-paranoid policyholder behavior is also
impractical and economically wasteful. Policyholder employees are pre-
90. See Granite Constr. Co. Inc. v. Bituminous Ins. Co., 832 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. App.
1992); J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 645 N.E.2d 980, 982 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) (certificates of insurance may be used to confirm existence of a policy, but courts nor-
mally accord no weight to certificate language in conflict with policy language); STEMPEL &
KNUTSEN, supra note 1, § 3.05 [B][I].
91. Some jurisdictions provide that when the policyholder has had the opportunity to re-
view the policy, then the policyholder is presumed to know, assent to, and understand the
terms. See Busker on the Roof P'Ship v. Warrington, 283 A.D.2d 376, 377 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Tellis, 192 So. 3d 386, 390-91 (Ala. 2015). However,
other jurisdictions do not impose this duty on policyholders unless it would be "unreason-
able" for them not to read it. See Hun Nam Tran v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 408 F.3d 130,
137 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying Pennsylvania law).
92. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co., 517 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994); Atwater
Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1985) (adopting reason-
able expectations principle that permits policyholder's objectively reasonable expectations of
coverage to control despite adverse policy text if text is hidden or unfairly surprising but not
if coverage-defeating text is located in portion of the policy (e.g., an exclusion) where it
should have been noticed by policyholder).
Even this limited concept of the reasonable expectations approach, where policyholder ex-
pectations can be defeated by policy text that may well have never been read by the policy-
holder, would appear to limit enforcement of anti-Zeig clauses. This is so because although
they defeat coverage, they are not denominated as exclusions and are not stated as part of the
attachment point or underlying limit set forth in the policy's declarations page.
93. See generally STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1, at ch. 9 (insurer has duties to policy-
holder that are fiduciary in nature and in some cases (e.g., when insurer is defending a lia-
bility claim) fully fiduciary).
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sumably focused on the work of the policyholder, which presumably is
what a system premised on markets, entrepreneurism, and economic
growth would want. To the extent that a policyholder that thought it
had made a prudent risk management purchase (a tower of excess or um-
brella insurance) is diverted from its core commercial activity (e.g., de-
signing, making, building, selling) of more productive work by a need
to flyspeck policies for anti-Zeig clauses or other unexpected limitations
of coverage, inefficiency results.
In the typical insurance placement environment, a policyholder and its
broker can simply fail to appreciate the risk of anti-Zeig clauses, hence the
common lack of discussion of such clauses and the common failure of pol-
icyholders to search the eventually resulting excess policy for anti-Zeig
language. Even commercial policyholders can fail to catch anti-Zeig lan-
guage that may have been included in the policy issued without any dis-
cussion or perhaps even contrary to the understanding of the parties.94
Brokers and risk managers may have thought that the Zeig rule governed
(as it did in California before Qualcomm) only to be surprised by a case,
like Qualcomm, rejecting that longstanding approach. It is unwise and un-
fair to visit upon policyholders the drastic sanction of losing all excess
coverage based on error by a broker or other policyholder representative
(risk managers, consultants, or lawyers also may have overlooked the issue
or failed to catch a documentation error) unless an insurer is actually
harmed by the Zeig approach to attachment. 95
In addition, anti-Zeig language may not be particularly clear, which fur-
ther increases the risk that policyholders may overlook it or read it in a way
94. If this were the case, the erroneously inserted language should be subject to challenge
even in the absence of fraud. But many courts refuse to consider extrinsic evidence of policy
meaning of the text if the policy is clear on its face. This type of mistake should preclude
judicial enforcement of the incorrectly inserted term. Other courts may (erroneously) invoke
the parol evidence rule. Even if a document recites that it is fully integrated (which insurance
policies seldom do), the correct approach to the parol evidence rule is to at least permit ev-
idence on the issue of whether a writing is in fact accurate. See DAVID EPSTEIN, BRUCE MAR-
KELL & LAURENCE PONOROFF, MAING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 488-522
(4th ed. 2014) (noting that this is the majority approach to the doctrine and implicitly crit-
icizing excerpted case to the contrary); FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 7.3.
95. One obvious excess insurer response to this factor is to argue that failure to catch the
problem of the lurking underlying-insurer-must-pay clause is to recognize it as professional
negligence by the broker or other policyholder representative, in turn triggering the mal-
practice liability policies of the representative. Although the analysis may be correct (counsel
for large commercial policyholders appear to regard such oversights as falling below the bro-
kers' standard of care), efforts to make the policyholder whole in this manner entail substan-
tial collateral litigation, expense, and uncertainty, imposing unnecessary transaction costs on
the judiciary, third parties, and society all in the service of allowing an excess insurer to
avoid all coverage responsibility regardless of the merits of the coverage claim. In addition,
in cases involving individuals and small businesses, the relevant brokers or other intermedi-
aries may lack sufficient errors and omissions coverage to rectify the loss suffered by the pol-
icyholder (or assignee claimant) if the underlying-insurer-must-pay clause is enforced.
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that differs from the construction ultimately adopted by a court adjudicat-
ing a coverage dispute that ensues years later. Although this concern can
perhaps be cured by courts consistently requiring crystal-clear clarity in
such clauses, that solution is probably unrealistic in light of the dispersion
of insurance law authority (due to the state-law-centered nature of insur-
ance)96 and judicial variation in analysis and jurisdictional authority.
b. Mainstream Contract Law Doctrine Counsels Against Overliteral Appli-
cation of Anti-Zeig Language-The actual operation of insurance policy
placement, which frequently involves little specific focus on the text of
the policy (particularly for individual and small business purchasers),
also makes a case for taking a jaundiced eye toward anti-Zeig clauses on
traditional contract law grounds.
Standard Anglo-American contract law tends to provide little escape
from a contract provision that one party comes to regret.9 7 A policyholder
faced with an insolvent insurer or a recalcitrant underlying insurer unwill-
ing to concede coverage but willing to settle undoubtedly regrets having
an anti-Zeig clause in the policy. But importantly, the policyholder prob-
ably did not specifically discuss or negotiate the clause and may not have
been aware of it at all. As discussed further below, one response to the
problem is to realize that although policy text is one important indicium
of the meaning of the policy, the intent of the parties, and the purpose of
the contract, policy text is not necessarily definitive evidence of any of
these things. The policy text is not even, strictly speaking, the contract.9 8
i. MISTAKE, UNCONSCIONABILITY, OR CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT § 211
As GROUNDS FOR AVOIDANCE OF ANTI-ZEIG LANGUAGE-Even in this "a
deal's a deal" atmosphere, 99 standard contract law permits relief not only
96. At a minimum, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1101, largely makes sub-
stantive insurance law and regulation a matter of state law. See STEMPEL, SwISHER & KNUT-
SEN, supra note 3, at 213-22. There is also the potential application of federal common law
for excess policies implicated in claims pursuant to the Employee Retirement and Income
Security Act (ERISA). See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1, § 3.04. And because diversity
jurisdiction often exists for insurer-policyholder disputes, many decisions are rendered in
federal trial and appellate courts, which do not provide binding authority. Meanwhile, deci-
sions in state trial courts are not binding on other trial courts and in many states differing
appellate court rulings may not be binding throughout the state. Above all, judges reading
the very same language often come to considerably different conclusions as to the meaning
of the text in question. See STEMPEL, SWISHER & KNUTSEN, supra note 3, at ch. 11 (juxtapos-
ing liability insurance cases from differing courts where the courts divide as to the meaning
of the very same language in standardized insurance policies).
97. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOuR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECI-
sIoNs 26-27 (1998) ("only rarely will a court allow you to change your mind and renege on a
binding promise").
98. See text accompanying notes 131-40, infra.
99. But, at the risk of being unduly repetitive, this article takes the position that anti-Zeig
clauses should not be considered part of the excess insurance arrangement unless specifically
negotiated or actually understood to be part of the contract by the policyholder.
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for a mutual mistake of both parties 00 but under certain circumstance it
also relieves a party of its unilateral mistake, a principle adopted by the Re-
statement of Contracts.101
An unconscionable provision is one that is either sufficiently the prod-
uct of bargaining misconduct or unreasonably favorable to a contracting
party.10 2 Where a contract provision is unconscionable, a "court may re-
fuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result."103 Although
100. A mistake is "a belief that is not in accord with the facts." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 151 (Am. LAW INST. 1981). Where both parties when making a contract are
mistaken "as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made" and this mistake "has a
material effect on the agreed exchange," the contract is "voidable by the adversely affected
party unless he bears the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in [Restatement] § 154.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1). Courts may ameliorate the impact of
mistake through reformation, through restitution, or by provision of other relief from the
strict enforcement of the contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(2).
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 153 and 154:
§ 153 When Mistake of One Party Makes a Contract Voidable
Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on
which he made the contract has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances
that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable by him if he does not bear the risk of the
mistake under the rule stated in § 154, and
(a) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscio-
nable or
(b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake of his fault caused the mistake.
§ 154 When a Party Bears the Risk of a Mistake
A party "bears the risk of a mistake" when
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with
respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as
sufficient, or
(c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it is reasonable in the cir-
cumstances to do so.
102. Unconscionability, although not specifically defined in the UCC or the Restatement,
is generally "recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (cited as
a commonly accepted definition in FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 4.28 at 301). Accord PE-
RILLO, supra note 78, § 9.40 (noting lack of universal agreement on precise definition and re-
viewing various formulations of unconscionability concept). More recently, courts have
tended to adopt a sliding-scale approach in which a provision that is too one-sided will
not be enforced even if the aggrieved party had some degree of choice. See, e.g., Gonski v.
2d Jud. Dist. Ct., 245 P.3d 1164 (Nev. 2010); 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CON-
TRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 2010); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6
P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
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many courts require both "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionabil-
ity to trigger this power of review, better-reasoned decisions use a "sliding
scale" approach in which a sufficient amount of either contracting defect or
substantive unfairness may prevent application of the one-sided term.104
The Restatement of Contracts further provides:
Where a writing that evidences or embodies an agreement in whole or part
fails to express the agreement because of a mistake of both parties as to the
contents or effect of the writing, the court may at the request of a party re-
form the writing to express the agreement, except to the extent that rights of
third parties as good faith purchasers for value will be unfairly affected.os
Thus, despite the general reverence for the language of a contract
document, there is mainstream authority supporting modification or
even complete nonenforcement of sufficiently unfair terms, terms ob-
tained unfairly, or terms found in a contract document about which one
of the contracting parties was mistaken. "An increasing number of cases
have permitted avoidance where only one party was mistaken," and avoid-
ance "is generally allowed if two conditions concur: (1) enforcement of the
contract against the mistaken party would be oppressive, or, at least, result
in an unconscionably unequal exchange of values, and (2) avoidance would
impose no substantial hardship on the other than loss of bargain."106
In the absence of actual injury to excess insurers due to the absence of
payment by an underlying insurer, anti-Zeig clauses placed in excess pol-
icies as a matter of course would appear to satisfy this requirement-and
perhaps would be unenforceable in many circumstances (such as the three
Illustrations previously set forth) on unconscionability grounds even in
the absence of mistake. 107
Where the contract memorialization is routine or standardized, courts
have particular license to ensure that the specific language of boilerplate
provisions does not impose unanticipated unfairness at odds with the un-
derstanding of the adversely affected party and does not gut the purpose
of the contract. Where one party to a contract "has reason to believe that
the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writ-
ing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement."108
Taken together, these accepted principles reflected in the Contracts
Restatement make a strong case for disregarding anti-Zeig clauses and
other lopsided terms that would cause complete forfeiture of contract
104. See, e.g., Gonski, 245 P.3d 1164.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155.
106. See PERILLO, supra note 78, § 9.27 at 321 (footnotes omitted).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208. By its terms, § 208 and the cases upon
which it builds did not require mistake to support judicial action against unconscionable pro-
visions. See, e.g., Gonski, 245 P.3d 1164; Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211.
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benefits-unless the excess insurer relying on the clause can demonstrate
injury from any failure to satisfy the conditions of the clause. And to the
extent that a policyholder's failure to anticipate, detect, or appreciate an
anti-Zeig clause can be characterized as a mistake, this may provide an ad-
ditional traditional ground for refraining from literal application of anti-
Zeig provisions.
In light of the realities of insurance policy placement and documenta-
tion, one can reasonably posit that policyholders reasonably expect not to
have coverage defeated by anti-Zeig clauses of which they were unaware at
the time of contracting. Absent evidence of actual discussion of such
clauses, it is more than reasonable to assume that a policyholder was
not aware of the clause.
The reasonable expectations concept well-developed in insurance law
posits that policyholders should be accorded coverage consistent with
their objectively reasonable expectations (e.g., expecting excess insurance
to attach at its attachment point regardless of the source of underlying
payment) and that they not be bound by coverage-defeating language
that is hidden, unclear, or unfairly surprising. Cases applying the reason-
able expectations approach have found this standard met when language
tending to operate as an exclusion or defeat coverage is found in a "Def-
initions" or "Conditions" section of a policy rather than in the "Exclu-
sions" portion of the policy.109 As reflected in the three Illustrations set
forth above, anti-Zeig language in an attachment section of a policy effec-
tively becomes an exclusion as well as being a provision consumer policy-
holders and many business policyholders would not expect.
One can argue, of course, that the policyholder who failed to read an
excess policy closely (when it finally arrives) is, in the language of Con-
tracts Restatement § 154, "aware, at the time the contract is made, that
he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts [contract lan-
guage] to which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as
sufficient [by purchasing the policy without reading]." One can argue
that the risk of mistake lies with the policyholder who contracted for
the excess policy without first gaining sufficient information about possi-
ble anti-Zeig language in the policy. As provided in Restatement § 154(b),
a policyholder adversely impacted by anti-Zeig language it did not antic-
109. See, e.g., Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn.
1985) (requirement that there be visible marks of entry in order to obtain burglary coverage
not enforced because it contradicted policyholder reasonable expectations of coverage and
was comparatively hidden from the policyholder in definitions section of policy rather
than noted as an exclusion or express limitation of coverage. See MANILOFF & STEMPEL,
supra note 3, at ch. 22 (reviewing concept, citing leading secondary literature, and reviewing
state law on use of reasonable expectations approach in construing insurance policies); STEM-
PEL, SWISHER & KNUTSEN, supra note 3, § 2.09 (discussing reasonable expectations principle
and application in cases of contested coverage).
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ipate could be said to have acted with limited knowledge but riskily
treated its limited knowledge as sufficient. But this view seems inapt in
the fluid setting of excess insurance sales.
If excess insurance policies-even long and complex forms-were laid
on a table before the policyholder prior to the sale of the policy, this po-
sition would have something to recommend it. But in light of the actual
operation of insurance policy sales and placement, with memorialization
coming so far after the sale and with little or no discussion of the bulk
of policy terms, this position is harsh. A policyholder should be consid-
ered sufficiently mistaken to permit relief from anti-Zeig clauses only if
this aspect of the policy (exhaustion of underlying limit and attachment),
including any purported necessity for payment only by underlying insur-
ers, was adequately disclosed or discussed.
When there was no policy available at the time of contracting, the case
for treating policy text as either "the" contract or the best evidence of
party intent or contract purpose becomes very weak. Consumers and
small businesses may not even have enough market power to obtain a
copy of the policy prior to purchase.
Although traditional contract doctrine imposes a "duty to read" on
contracting parties, 110 this seems unrealistic in the real world of risk man-
agement. Is the policyholder who detects an anti-Zeig clause after poring
over the policy that arrives weeks after sale really supposed to object and
cancel the policy if the insurer will not delete the clause, forcing the pol-
icyholder to again shop the market for excess coverage?
Placing this sort of burden on the policyholder is particularly unfair in
light of rather consistent evidence in the cognitive science literature of a
natural human tendency toward "optimism bias"-a tendency to overly
discount the risk of a negative development (e.g., insolvency of an under-
lying insurer or a coverage dispute with an underlying insurer).1 11
In addition, rational policyholders would not knowingly agree to such
draconian provisions unless required by a hard insurance market112 or un-
less the policyholder made a conscious decision to accept the limitation
110. See explanation of duty to read, supra note 91.
111. Optimism bias is the "inclination of individuals to believe that there is an above-
average chance of good things happening to them and a below-average chance of bad things
happening." See David Adam Friedman, Debiasing Advertising: Balancing Risk, Hope, and Social
Welfare, 19 J.L. & POL'Y 539, 586 (2011).
112. A "hard" insurance market is one in which, due to adverse underwriting and claims
conditions, insurance coverage is hard to obtain and tends to be expensive, often being ac-
companied by relatively low policy limits, high retentions, or particularized limits on cover-
age. By contrast, a "soft" market is one in which relatively broad coverage with high policy
limits is available in the marketplace at comparatively low premium. See generally Sean M.
Fitzpatrick, Fear Is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 10 CoNN. INs. LJ.
255, 257 (2004).
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on coverage in return for a lower premium or some other countervailing
favorable policy provision. This would appear to make Contracts Restate-
ment § 211 applicable.'
Rational policyholders, if not mistaken as to the presence of anti-Zeig
language in a policy form, would not accept the provision in light of the
risk (reflected in this article's three Illustrations) of underlying insurer in-
solvency or coverage disputes. Only if it received a significant premium
discount would a rational policyholder accept a policy provision that ef-
fectively gave any insurer in the coverage tower veto power over settle-
ment of coverage disputes.
ii. THE MATERIAL BREACH CONCEPT As GROUNDS FOR DECLINING TO
ENFORCE ANTI-zEIG TEXT-Another aspect of mainstream contract doc-
trine counsels in favor of Zeig-like treatment of these issues rather than
the Qualcomm approach. Pursuant to longstanding contract law, the vic-
tim of material breach of a contract may lawfully repudiate the contract
(as well as collect damages suffered prior to repudiation), while victims
of minor breach can collect damages due to the breach but may [not]
avoid the contract.114 These victims of minor breach must still perform
their contractual obligations.1 1 s As explained by Professor Farnsworth:
In order for a breach to justify the injured party's suspension of performance,
the breach must be significant enough to amount to the nonoccurrence of a
constructive condition of exchange. Such a breach is termed "material." . . .
The doctrine of material breach is simply the converse of the doctrine of sub-
stantial performance. Substantial performance is performance without a material
breach, and a material breach results in performance that is not substantial....
[The most significant fact in determining the existence of material breach] is
the extent to which the breach will deprive the injured party of the benefit
that it justifiably expected. ... 116
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 211 provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise
manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly
used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an in-
tegrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly
situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms
of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent
would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is
not part of the agreement.
114. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, §§ 8.15-8.16.
115. See id.
116. See id. § 8.16 at 566-68 (footnotes omitted). Accord PERRILLO, supra note 78, § 11.18
at 375-77. See, e.g., Fires Sec. Bank v. Murphy, 964 P.2d 654 (Idaho 1998) ("breach of con-
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The Restatement of Contracts adopts this view,1 1 7 as do the Vienna Con-
vention1 18 and the UNIDROIT Principles. 119 Restatement § 241 lists the
"Circumstances in Determining Whether a Failure Is Material" as
The extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which
he reasonably expected;
The extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the
part of the benefit of which he will be deprived;
The extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will
suffer forfeiture;
The likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will
cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances, including any rea-
sonable assurance;
The extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.120
Applied to excess insurance attachment, the material breach concept
augers in favor of treating payment by a policyholder or third party
(rather than an underlying insurer) as only a minor breach rather than a
material breach. Unless the source of payment defeats the purpose of
the attachment point-limiting the excess insurer's coverage responsibil-
ity to only claims over a minimum amount-the source of payment does
not operate to deprive the excess insurer of the benefit of its bargain to
begin providing insurance coverage at a certain level, particularly when
the excess insurer retains all of its nonattachment/anti-Zeig defenses.
Where payment by the policyholder or entity other than an underlying
insurer is not accompanied by fraud, collusion, self-dealing, or inadequate
vetting of a claim sufficient to harm the excess insurer, enforcement of an
anti-Zeig clause is inconsistent with basic contract law.
tract is not material if substantial performance has been rendered"); Liddle v. Petty, 816 P.2d
1066 (Mont. 1991) (where a party "materially breaches the contract, the injured party is en-
titled to suspend his performance") (purchaser's failure to pay was material breach). See also
FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 8.16 at 567 n.3 ("Although usage is not uniform, there is a
commendable tendency among courts and scholars to use substantial in the sense of 'almost
complete' and material in the sense of 'more than just a little."').
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs §§ 237-49.
118. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M.
679, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.
119. See UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, art. 6 (2010).
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 241(a)-(e).
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3. The Quacomm Approach Impedes Settlement of Claims and the Risk
Management Function of Insurance, Creating Increased Litigation,
Inefficient Resolution of Claims, and Insufficient Compensation of
Victims
The practical effect of a Qualcomm-style approach is to make settlement of
complex cases involving towers of insurance much more difficult. Excess
insurers are given an incentive to sit on the sidelines if they think an un-
derlying carrier will not be forced to pay full policy limits.
When settlement is hindered, informal dispute resolution costs (e.g.,
negotiation, mediation) increase. Litigation costs also increase when set-
tlement cannot be attained. These negative outcomes in turn increase the
workload of courts and the costs paid by parties to a dispute. Systemic so-
cial costs thus increase.
In addition, to the extent that the Qualcomm approach permits excess
insurers to avoid their coverage responsibility on this "exhaustion tech-
nicality," insurance funds are taken out of the pot otherwise available
to compensate victims. Undercompensated victims in turn are more
likely to seek and obtain public assistance benefits, imposing additional
social costs and taxation-all for risks that were supposed to have been
shifted to the excess insurer, spread throughout the excess insurer's risk
pool, and funded by policyholder premium payments rather than tax
dollars.
4. Requiring Excess Insurance to Attach When Underlying Limits Are
Paid Without Regard to the Source of Payment Is Not Unfair to
Excess Insurers-They Retain All Other Coverage Defenses That
May Legitimately Be Available
As previously noted, excess insurers may argue that language requiring un-
derlying limits to be paid by an underlying insurer is necessary to protect
the excess insurer from "sweetheart" deals between an insured (or the plain-
tiff to whom the insured has transferred its rights) and a relatively low limit
insurer (such as a primary insurer eager to cease paying defense costs).
This is a legitimate concern if the underlying loss amount does not in
fact legitimately exceed the excess insurer's underlying limit or ifno one is
actually paying the balance of that underlying limit amount. But it is a
concern that can be (and often is) addressed by a direct attack on a suspect
settlement, rather than by permitting an across-the-board forfeiture of ex-
cess coverage, even for insureds who in good faith pay a portion of actual
liability losses from their own pockets in an effort to settle underlying lit-
igation and to avoid coverage litigation.
If a settlement is suspect because of collusion or unreasonableness, or
because the insured's "payment" of a share of the underlying limit is illu-
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sory, the excess insurer retains the right to challenge coverage on that
basis. There is no need to give the excess insurer the blanket protection
of the Qualcomm approach where it suffers no economic detriment.
In addition, general liability excess insurers have available all other
nonfrivolous defenses available under the facts of a particular case: pollu-
tion exclusion, own work, own property, impaired property, expected or
intended injury, lack of an occurrence, late notice, failure to cooperate, re-
scission based on fraud or misrepresentation, and so on.121 Under these
circumstances, there is no need to provide excess insurers with another
defense to coverage that bears no realistic connection to the risk assumed
for which the excess insurer has received and enjoyed earnings on premi-
ums, often for years, before it is asked to provide coverage.
C. Warring Visions of Contract and Insurance: The Textualism Overkill of
Qualcomm and the Pragmatic Purposivism of Zeig
The Zeig approach has been relegated by some courts and the ALI to a
mere default rule because it stated that it was "doubtless true that the par-
ties could impose [an underlying-insurer-must-pay requirement as a] con-
dition precedent to liability upon the policy, if they chose to do so." 122
Seizing upon this language, courts like Qualcomm concluded that when
an excess insurance policy does contain underlying-insurer-must-pay lan-
guage, the insurer has altered the default rule of Zeig and that the policy
language controls, no matter how pernicious its effect. 123
However, as noted in the discussion of Zeig above, Zeig also stated that
any particularized exhaustion language in an excess policy should "de-
mand" a result. 124 "A result [loss of all coverage where all of an underlying
limit is not paid by the underlying insurer alone] harmful to the insured,
and of no rational advantage to the insurer, ought only to be reached
when the terms of the contract demand it." 12 5 One can thus interpret
Zeig as not only requiring particular-and particularly clear-exhaustion
language to avoid the Zeig approach but also as requiring that the appli-
cation of such a policy provision be consistent with other aspects of con-
121. See generally MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 3 (surveying state law regarding more
than twenty areas of recurring coverage disputes reflecting insurer grounds for seeking to
avoid coverage).
122. See Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 665, 666 (2d Cir. 1928) (applying
federal common law) (case decided prior to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)).
123. See Comerica Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (E.D. Mich. 2007);
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 779 (Ct. App.
2008).
124. See supra text accompanying note 36.
125. See Zeig, 23 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added).
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tract law such as avoiding absurd results; avoiding undue forfeitures;
avoiding unfair windfalls to one contracting party, particularly when
based on a textual provision that was not obvious or expressly discussed
or understood; or rendering a result consistent with public policy and
the larger goals of contract and insurance.
So interpreted, and of course as a default rule, Zeig reflects an emphasis
on contract purpose and function as well as pragmatic application and
overall fairness. Zeig did not say that the policyholder automatically
could collect from the excess insurer. Rather, the case was remanded to
the trial court so that the policyholder could be given the opportunity
to prove that its loss reached the excess layer of insurance. 12 6 The excess
insurer retained the right to contest the amount of loss and presumably
any other coverage defenses, including collusion between the policyholder
and any underlying insurer.
By contrast, the Qua/comm approach, although not devoid of functional
analysis, 127 is unduly bound by text. 128 Qua/comm and like cases reflect a
highly textual, highly formalist approach to contract. Zeig, despite charac-
terization as a default rule case, reflects a functional and purposive view,
one that implicitly recognizes that in addition to being contracts, insur-
ance policies have aspects of products designed to fill a particular function
as part of a risk management and socioeconomic system. 129
The contrasting Zeig and Qua/comm approaches reflect a significant
fault line in contract jurisprudence and insurance law. One approach
treats the text of contract documents and insurance policies almost as
sacred text that must be strictly enforced according to its verbiage, not-
126. See id.
127. For example, Qualcomm notes in the excess insurer argument that it included the
underlying-insurer-must-pay language into the policy in an attempt to achieve greater assur-
ance that the claim was sufficiently vigorously vetted and defended so as to reduce the risk
that the attachment point would be reached. See Qualcomm, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 784. How-
ever, Qualcomm gives relatively little consideration to the strong functional arguments against
enforcement of the underlying-insurer-must-pay clause at issue. See id. at 785-86. In essence,
as discussed above, it is good enough for the Qualcomm court that the policy contains lan-
guage requiring payment by all underlying insurers as a prerequisite to attachment of the ex-
cess policy.
128. See id. at 772 (court concluded "that the literal policy language in this case governs"),
777 ("As to the exhaustion [anti-Zeig] clause, we cannot detect ambiguity" and "[u]nder these
circumstances, Qualcomm's objectively reasonable expectations as the insured were that pri-
mary insurance would have to be exhausted before excess coverage would attach.").
129. See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, supra note 56; Jeffrey W. Stem-
pel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INs. L. J. 813 (2009); Daniel Schwarcz, A
Product Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389
(2007). In addition, insurance policies can be analogized to regulated industries (see Ken-
neth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2013)) or standard-
ized private legislation (although excess policies are generally less standardized than primary
policies). See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 McGEORGE L. REV. 203
(2009).
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withstanding that agreement regarding textual clarity is often illusive. The
other approach treats contracting, including the purchase of an insurance
policy, as a purposive endeavor designed to fulfill a function. I long ago
cast my lot with the functionalists. 130 The problems of the Qualcomm ap-
proach have only solidified that view.
D. Strict Enforcement ofAnti-Zeig Clauses Erroneously Treats Policy
Language as "The Contract" When a Better View Is That Policy Language
Is Merely Memorialization of the Contractual Undertaking of the Parties
The Qualcomm approach rests on the proposition that where language in
an excess insurance policy text states that all payment must be made by the
underlying insurer, this language must be enforced because it definitively
represents the deal made between the policyholder and excess insurer, re-
gardless of fairness, function, or public policy concerns.
But despite thousands of cases referring to a written instrument (e.g.,
insurance policies, apartment leases, sale invoices, bills of lading, con-
struction agreements) as "the contract," this characterization is oversim-
plified. It may be handy shorthand to refer to the writing as the "contract"
between the parties, but that is not technically accurate and may lead to
mischievous results. A leading contract law textbook explains as follows.
People often use the word "contract" to refer to the writing that embodies
the agreement or deal....
But the piece of paper is not a "contract." At least it is not a "contract" as we
will be using the word "contract." At most, the piece of paper is a memori-
alization of the contract....
In law school (and usually in the practice of law), a contract is a promise or
set of promises that the law will enforce.
At bottom, contract law exists to satisfy the basic impulse-to which most
people subscribe-that the reasonable expectations excited by a promise, if
and when disappointed without legal excuse, are entided to recompense in
a court of law."1
Under this view, an excess insurance policy may (despite the importance
of its textual content) be seen as embodying a basic agreement. When un-
derlying insurance is no longer available, the excess insurer will respond, as
130. See articles cited in note 129. See also STEMPEL, SwISHER & KNUTSEN, supra note 3, at
ch. 2; STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1, at ch. 4; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations:
Undue Restriction ofthe Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology offudicial
Role, 5 CONN. INs. L.J. 181 (1998-99). Accord YONG Q. HAN, POLICYHOLDER'S REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS (2016); MALCOLM CLARKE, POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF INSURANCE (1997).
131. See EPSTEIN, MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra note 94, at 12-13.
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long as it receives the protection it would have had from full performance
by an underlying insurer so that the excess policy will not attach at a mon-
etary level lower than the underlying limit stated in the policy.
Seen in this way, it would appear that defense and settlement payments
(or payment of a judgment) by the policyholder up to the level of the un-
derlying limit would be sufficient to protect the excess insurer from re-
sponding below its agreed attachment point, regardless of whether the
policyholder was paying the underlying limit because of insolvency of
the underlying insurer or because a coverage dispute at the underlying
level had been compromised.
Even if the excess insurance policy contains a clearly worded anti-Zeig
clause, one can question whether this is really the "contract" made by the
excess insurer and the policyholder, which reasonably expected that if its
liability reached the attachment point of the excess insurer, the excess in-
surer would respond. 132
If the excess insurer can demonstrate that there was specific agreement
that only payments by an underlying insurer exhaust the underlying limit or
that the excess insurer was substantially prejudiced by payment of the un-
derlying limit through alternative means, the excess insurer would then-
like the insurer prejudiced by late notice-be able to avoid coverage on
that basis. Absent such a showing by the excess insurer, it is unwise to
incur the detrimental aspects of literal enforcement of an anti-Zeig clause.
To a degree, the clash over whether to allow policyholders to satisfy
the underlying limit and eliminate any gap (due to insolvency, settlement,
or more restrictive coverage in an underlying policy) between recovered
insurance and the attachment point of excess insurance reflects a broader
division in law concerning apt construction of insurance policies.
Insurance policies are, of course, contracts.133 But an insurance policy
differs in several ways from garden variety contracts, 134 although tradi-
132. Once again, it is important to stress that even if an excess insurer is not permitted to
enforce "underlying limits can only be paid by an underlying insurer" language in its policy,
the excess insurer would retain any other defenses to coverage it may have-not only sweep-
ing defenses such as fraud, collusion, and an unreasonable settlement amount, but also spe-
cific coverage defenses based on a failure to satisfy a condition or the applicability of an ex-
clusion, such as the pollution exclusion.
133. See STEMPEL, SWISHER & KNUTSEN, supra note 3, at 99; ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOuG
LAS S. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25A (4th ed. 2012) (treating insurance
policies as contracts). Typical of judicial pronouncements on the topic is Good v. Krohn, 786
N.E.2d 480, 485 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002), in which the court stated: "It is well-settled that an
insurance policy is a contract and that the relationship between the insured and the insurer is
purely contractual in nature." However, "[t]his statement, although basically correct, glosses
over a host of complexities of both insurance and contract." STEMPEL, SWISHER & KNUTSEN,
supra note 3, at 99.
134. Among the differences between insurance and a typical purchase are that the insur-
ance policy is an aleatory contract in which the contractual exchange cannot be deemed
equal, even if one accepts each party's valuation as conclusive. A policyholder may pay sub-
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tionalists do not see these differences as supporting any departure from
standard contract theory in assessing insurance policies. 135
In addition, courts and commentators differ in their deference to the
text of an insurance policy or other written instrument. Reduced defer-
ence to policy text can be justified not only by public policy concerns
or greater recognition of the limits of language, but also by greater appre-
ciation of the other identities of insurance policies, which not only are
contracts but also operate in the nature of products,13 6 private legislation
crafted by the insurance industry and essentially imposed on most policy-
holders,13 7 and purposive instruments designed to accomplish particular
functions in the real world.1 38 Construction of insurance policies-and
stantial premiums for decades and never submit a claim, while, conversely, an insurer may be
required to pay for catastrophic loss only days after a policy takes effect that far exceeds the
premium paid. See EDWIN W. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 62 (2d ed. 1957).
In addition, insurance policies are generally dramatically longer and more complex than
most written instruments, even the occasionally baroque leases and chronically impenetrable
credit card and mobile phone "agreements" inserted into monthly billings. The insurance
policy is typically received weeks or even months after the contract was made. In most
cases, the insurer also has dramatically more bargaining power and expertise than the poli-
cyholder. Policyholders are also generally more vulnerable than other contracting parties in
the event of breach. Where the insurer is charged with defending a suit against the policy-
holder, most jurisdictions regard the insurer as acting in a fiduciary capacity. See STEMPEL &
KNUTSEN, supra note 1, at 99-107. Insurance appears to exhibit these departures from the
classic bargaining model more often than most contractual agreements.
135. See, e.g., Michael Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance
Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171 (1995); David S.
Miller, Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1849 (1988). But see Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory ofIlnsurance Policy Inter-
pretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531 (1996) (ambiguity principle central to insurance law).
136. See Stempel, Insurance Policy as Thing, supra note 129; Schwarcz, supra note 129.
One court decision invoking a strong form of the reasonable expectations approach to re-
solving insurance coverage disputes noted the product-like nature of insurance by using an
implied warranty analogy, but this metaphor failed to catch on. See, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v.
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177-79 (Iowa 1976) (suggesting that an insurance policy
may be in breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose where text in the
policy would reduce coverage below what is reasonably expected by the typical policyholder)
("[P]olicy [of burglary insurance with requirement of visible marks of forced entry] provided
by defendant in this instance breached the implied warranty of fitness for its intended purpose.
It altered and impaired the fair meaning of the bargain these parties made for plaintiff's insur-
ance protection."). Only a handful of cases have cited C &J Fertilizer's warranty language. Most
decisions in this vein do not expressly invoke the breach-of-warranty concept, although it is
certainly consistent with the reasonable expectations principle. See, e.g., Great Lakes Chem.
Corp. v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 638 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (where policy
text is seemingly clear but results only in illusory coverage, court will construe policy to com-
port with policyholder's reasonable expectations); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 425 P.2d 346,
347 (Nev. 1967) (complexity of insurance policies and comparative expertise and sophistication
of insurer may require that courts not be bound by "strict legal [contract] doctrine" in constru-
ing a policy or conditional receipt); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Pol-
icy Provisions (Part I), 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970).
137. See Stempel, Insurance Poliy as Statute, supra note 129.
138. See Stempel, Insurance Poliy as Social Instrument, supra note 56.
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the relationship among insurers, policyholders, claimants, and the public-
can be substantially enriched by recognizing these alternative characteriza-
tions of insurance policies. The socioeconomic role of insurance, in particu-
lar, can be a valuable lens for assessing insurance policies and adjudicating
their operation.
In addition to being a contract between policyholder and insurer, the
insurance policy has a number of other important identities, most inter-
estingly as a "social instrument" or "social institution" that serves to facil-
itate socioeconomic activity.13 9 For that reason, various issues of insur-
ance policy construction should be addressed not only according to the
text of the insurance policy at issue or any specific documented intent
of the parties, but also according to the overarching purpose of the policy
and the socioeconomic role played by the policy, both as between the par-
ties and in relation to society at large. 140
E. Insurance Law's Modern Tradition of Refraining from Literal
Enforcement of Potentially Problematic Policy Provisions
There are many instances when courts refuse to give strict enforcement to
seemingly clear contract language when this would lead to a result that
conflicts with the purpose, function, or underlying intent of a contractual
instrument, such as an insurance policy.141 Sometimes courts are not par-
ticularly explanatory on this point and simply state that they are refusing
to enforce language that would make for an "absurd result." Courts often
take a similar approach to statutory interpretation. 142 Insurance coverage
disputes are no exception.
Requiring an insurer to prove substantial prejudice from late notice in
order to use this defense is an example of this sort of judicial overriding of
139. See id. at 1512-16 (describing socioeconomic functions of insurance).
140. See generally id.
141. See, e.g., Golden Road Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151 (Nev. 2016) (refusing
to enforce clear text of noncompete agreement in worker's contract because it was unreason-
able in scope, exceeded what was necessary to protect the employer's interests, and placed an
undue burden on the employee); Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277 (Ariz.
1999) (same but unlike Nevada, Arizona law permits a court to "blue pencil" the problematic
clause and edit it to meet the parameters of reasonableness as long as unreasonable provi-
sions are "grammatically severable"); Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734
(Conn. 2005) (refusing to enforce waiver of liability for negligence clause skiing/snow tubing
facility required as a condition of use); R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (refusing
to enforce clear terms of surrogate birth agreement on public policy grounds); In re Baby M,
537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988) (refusing to enforce surrogacy agreement on public policy
grounds); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. 1965) (refusing
to enforce terms in lending agreement deemed unconscionable).
142. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP FRiCKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 260-63 (2000); LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY IN-
TERPRETATION 17-18 (2008); WILLIAM D. PoPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TIoN 3-8 (2007).
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policy language-what one might call "super-functionalism" in that it
goes beyond merely construing policy language in a functionalist manner.
Instead, it effectively rewrites the text of the insurance policy to better fit
the purposes of insurance and to prevent the policyholder from suffering
the disproportionate forfeiture of losing all the insurance protection it
purchased simply because it was tardy giving notice even when the late
notice appears not to have harmed the insurer.
The clear majority rule is that late notice to the insurer of a loss or
claim under the policy will not result in a loss of coverage (even though
the policy states that prompt notice is a "condition precedent" to cover-
age) unless the insurer is substantially prejudiced by the late notice,
with the burden to prove prejudice ordinarily placed upon the insurer.143
One strains to find a reasonable basis for giving strict enforcement to an
anti-Zeig clause while refusing to give the same strict enforcement to
prompt notice provisions. The prompt notice requirement is arguably
more compelling in that an insurer has good reasons for wanting to
know about a loss or claim sooner than later in order to better investigate
and defend the matter. While requiring that the underlying insurer pay-
ment provides some increase in excess insurer assurance of proper vetting
of claims, one is hard-pressed to say it is a more compelling need than
notice.
Under these circumstances, it is hard to justify strict application of
payment-by-underlying-insurer-only clauses in the same judicial system
that denies strict enforcement to prompt notice requirements. California,
home to Qualcomm's adherence to payment-by-underlying-insurer-only
clauses, is a state well-known for enforcing prompt notice clauses only
when the insurer can demonstrate that it has been unduly prejudiced by
late notice. 144 Although recent cases have moved Michigan (the home
state of Comerica) back toward the traditional but now minority view
that late notice bars coverage, California continues to apply the notice-
prejudice rule that bars coverage when notice is late only if the insurer
can demonstrate that it was actually harmed by the late notice.145 And
the ALI Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance reflects a similar
view of late notice and hence an inconsistency as compared to anti-Zieg
143. See MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 3, at ch. 4.
144. See, e.g., Purefoy v. Pac. Auto. Indem. Exch., 53 P.2d 155 (Cal. 1935); Travelers
Prop. v. Centex Homes, No. C 10-02575, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36128 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 1, 2011); Slater v. Lawyers' Mutual Ins. Co., 227 Cal. App. 3d 1415 (Ct. App. 1991);
see also MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 3, at 57-58. California's notice-prejudice rule is
so well established that it was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and applied over in-
surer objections in a case subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), even though ERISA coverage disputes are generally subject to federal common
law.
145. See MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 3, at 57-58, 71-72.
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language. 146 Courts were correct to begin moving away from strict appli-
cation of notice requirements, a trend begun roughly fifty years ago.
There remain only a handful of hold-out states adhering to the traditional
formalist rule.147 Rather than reversing field on late notice, it would ob-
viously make more sense to adjudicate anti-Zeig clauses in the same man-
ner as late notice cases and to require excess insurers to show prejudice in
order to avoid otherwise available coverage merely because some or all of
the underlying limit was paid by an entity other than an underlying
insurer.
The clearly dominant judicial approach to notice of claim require-
ments is the functionalist approach known as the "notice-prejudice"
rule, meaning that a late notice defense was effective to deny coverage
only if the lateness of the notice had caused substantial prejudice to the
insurer. This approach had become the established approach in all but
a handful of states. 148 The ALI also adopts this position in § 37 of the
Restatement. 149
A major impetus for requiring prejudice to the insurer as a prerequisite
for enforcing a notice condition was that enforcing the condition to bar
coverage when the insurer had not suffered harm would be an unfair re-
sult, leading to disproportionate forfeiture of contract benefits by the pol-
icyholder. In spite of the importance of notice, courts have concluded that
notice conditions should be enforced only when the lateness of the notice
diminishes the insurer's rights in some substantial degree.
One can readily analogize prompt notice provisions to anti-Zeig
clauses. But as with late notice that does not cause prejudice to the in-
surer, satisfying the requirement of exhaustion through payments that
come from sources other than an underlying insurer would appear not
146. Compare RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 36(1) (adopting rule that
late notice bars coverage only if insurer substantially prejudiced), with RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 40 (providing for enforcement of payment-by-underlying-
insurer-only clauses).
147. See MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 3, at 51-54 (describing evolution from strict
application of prompt notice conditions precedent in policies to modern majority rule that
late notice bars coverage only if prejudicial to insurer).
148. MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 3, at ch. 4 (finding only Alabama, Arkansas, the
District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, and Virginia to expressly embrace the traditional
rule that a showing of late notice alone, even without a showing of prejudice to the insurer,
bars coverage). In the more than forty states that require prejudice as a prerequisite to en-
forcing a late notice requirement, all but a few states require the insurer to shoulder the bur-
den of proof to demonstrate prejudices, although a few states require the policyholder that
gave late notice to prove the absence of prejudice to the insurer.
149. For occurrence-based liability policies, "[t]he failure of the insured to satisfy a
notice-of-claim condition excuses an insurer from performance of its obligations under a li-
ability insurance policy only if the insurer demonstrates that it was prejudiced as a result. . .
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 36(1).
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to harm the excess insurer as long as the settlement was reasonable, non-
fraudulent, and not a collusive effort to unfairly trigger excess coverage
prior to actual payment of the requisite underlying amount to settle law-
suits or pay judgments.
These similarities between the requirements of prompt notice and pay-
ment of underlying limits undermines the literalist Qualcomm approach.
So does the similar treatment of policy provisions requiring a policy-
holder to cooperate with the insurer in responding to claims. Courts
will only strip a policyholder of coverage if the policyholder's failure to
cooperate prejudices the insurer's ability to respond to the claim.150
In similar fashion, courts have tended not to give literal enforcement to
insurance policy provisions requiring that the insurer consent to any set-
tlement with the claimant. In cases where an insurer has breached its duty
to defend or its duty to make reasonable settlement decisions, policyhold-
ers have been permitted to settle claims without insurer consent without
losing coverage. 151 Although the insurer in most states may continue to
150. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 30 ("An insured's breach of
the duty to cooperate relieves an insurer of its obligations under an insurance policy only if
the insurer demonstrates that the failure caused or will cause prejudice to the insurer); STEM-
PEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1, § 9.02; ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES
§ 3:2 (6th ed. 2012). RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 30(2) also provides
that were there has been "collusion with a claimant" that is discovered before prejudice oc-
curs, "the prejudice requirement is satisfied as long as the collusion would have caused prej-
udice to the insurer had it not been discovered." Courts typically require a fairly significant
failure to cooperate before even considering the issue of prejudice to the insurer. See, e.g.,
Home Indem. Co. v. Reed Equip. Co., 381 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 1980) (failure to cooperate
must be both "material and substantial" before coverage lost); Hartschorn v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 838 N.E.2d 211 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (breach and prejudice sufficient to deny cov-
erage found where property insurance policyholder, apparently intentionally, failed to pro-
vide documentation and failed three times to appear for examination under oath).
151. See THOMAS, supra note 37, § 17.07[1] (2012) ("If an insurer breaches its duty to de-
fend, however, the insured may enter into a reasonable, non-collusive settlement without the
consent of the insurer and without forfeiting coverage."); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LI-
ABILITY INSURANCE § 19 (an "insurer that breaches the duty to defend a legal action loses the
right to assert any control over the defense or settlement of the action" and may lose the
right to contest coverage if the breach is "without a reasonable basis"). See, e.g., Risely v. In-
terinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 343, 350 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Where the
insurer denies its insured a defense for covered claims, the insured may make reasonable,
noncollusive settlement with the third party, without the insurer's consent."). However, de-
pending on the applicable state law, the nondefending insurer may contest coverage of the
settlement on other grounds. See Stempel, Enhancing the Socially Instrumental Role ofInsurance,
supra note 65. See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 25(3):
When an insurer has reserved the right to contest coverage for a legal action, the insured may
settle the action without the consent of the insurer and without violating the duty to coop-
erate or other restrictions on the insured's settlement rights contained in the policy, provided
that certain requirements are met, including providing the insurer with notice, a chance to
withdraw its reservation, and that the settlement is reasonable.
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dispute coverage1 52 and may attack and avoid a settlement that is unrea-
sonable or collusive, 15 3 the insurer may not avoid coverage simply because
it withheld consent to the settlement.
Policy provisions concerning notice, cooperation, and consent-to-
settlement serve important purposes-at least as important as the "ade-
quate vetting" purpose used to justify anti-Zeig clauses. But these important
notice, cooperation, and consent provisions are not given the literal enforce-
ment that Qualcomm accords to seemingly less important underlying-
insurer-must-pay provisions. This asymmetry should trouble Qualcomm
enthusiasts, including the ALL.
Judicial treatment of anti-assignment clauses (also discussed above)
provides a similar example of courts refusing to give literal application
of clearly written insurance policy/contract text when this would defeat
the purpose of insurance or work a disproportionate forfeiture upon the
policyholder. Anti-assignment clauses are enforced if a policyholder as-
signs a policy to another prior to a liability-creating event because this
may increase the insurer's risk.154 But after the event has taken place,
the relative risk presented by the original policyholder and the assignee
is irrelevant. 155 Enforcing the anti-assignment clause if the assignment
comes after the loss makes even less sense than enforcing a prompt notice
provision when the insurer has not been harmed in its ability to respond
to the lawsuit due to late notice.
152. See Stempel, Enhancing the Socially Instrumental Role ofInsurance, supra note 65 (noting
that this is the majority rule but that a substantial number of states follow the arguably better
rule of precluding a breaching insurer from contesting coverage).
153. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSLRANCE § 37.
154. The typical anti-assignment clause is not a flat ban on assignment but rather requires
the insurer to consent to the assignment if it is to be effective. In this way, the insurer can
assess whether the transfer of the policy from one policyholder to another will increase risk.
155. Prior to a loss, an anti-assignment clause makes sense in that it prevents a relatively
low-risk policyholder (e.g., a clothing retail shop) from assigning its general liability or prop-
erty policies to a higher-risk policyholder (e.g., a chemical or munitions manufacturing
plant). By reserving the right to approve any assignments, the insurer protects itself from
having its risk exposure increased and may refuse assignment and insist on new underwriting
and premium increases as a condition of taking on the new, riskier policyholder. However,
after a loss involving the original policyholder has taken place, the insurer's coverage respon-
sibilities are fixed and are not increased when the original policyholder merely assigns its
right to payment of policy proceeds to a second policyholder. For this reason, courts have
traditionally refused to enforce anti-assignment clauses in post-loss situations. See, e.g.,
Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 100 F.2d 441 (8th Ci. 1939) (applying
Missouri law). See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 1, § 3.15 [D]. See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (assignment of contractual right generally
permitted unless it materially increases risk, burden, or duties; is prohibited by law or public
policy; or is "validly precluded by contract"). Because enforcement of an anti-assignment
clause post loss would deny payment of insurance proceeds for no good reason, this
would not be a valid preclusion and would work an undue forfeiture of insurance coverage
that has been purchased.
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Anti-Zeig language in an excess policy, although perhaps "plain" in
meaning, could be treated like anti-assignment clauses. Such clauses
clearly prohibit assignment, but courts routinely refuse to give them effect
when assignment post-dates loss because strict enforcement of an anti-
assignment clause at that juncture does not serve the purpose of the clause
and results in disproportionate forfeiture of the insurance for which a pol-
icyholder has paid. 156
Courts for decades have refused to strictly enforce anti-assignment
clauses (which are often more clearly written then the anti-Zeig clauses
in excess policies) to prevent assignment of rights to an insurance policy
as long as the assignment takes place after a covered event and does not
increase the hazard to the insurer or otherwise implicate the risk assumed
by the insurer. 15 7
Although policy text is, of course, important, use of policy text in the
literalist Qualcomm manner is reminiscent of the now-discredited ap-
proach strictly enforcing an anti-assignment clause that was taken in Hen-
kel Corp. v. Hartford Accident r Indemnity Co., 15 8 but more recently cor-
rectly rejected in Fluor Corporation v. Superior Court,159 In Henkel-like
fashion, the Qualcomm approach (and ALI Restatement § 40) elevates tex-
tual form over insurance operation substance and should be revised by
striking this portion of the draft.
Ironically, the Restatement, despite supporting enforcement of anti-
Zeig language in excess policies even without a showing of prejudice to
the insurer from exhaustion via other means, adopts the Fluor majority
rule in § 37(2), which states that "[r]ights of an insured under an insurance
policy relating to a specific claim that has been made against the insured
may be assigned without regard to an anti-assignment condition or other
term in the policy restricting such assignments." 160
Restatement § 38 (which provides for disregarding an unfair policy text
at odds with the apt operation of liability insurance) is thus in consider-
able tension with Restatement § 40 (which would permit excess insurers
to avoid proper operation of liability insurance through policy text).
The tension can be rectified to a degree in that although literal enforce-
ment of underlying-insurer-must-pay language is problematic, the policy
provision makes some sense. All other things being equal, full payment by
156. See Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court, 354 P.3d 302 (Cal. 2015) (summarizing tradi-
tional treatment of anti-assignment clauses and justifying permitting assignment of policy
benefits where loss precedes assignment).
157. See, e.g., Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 100 F.2d 441.
158. 62 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2003).
159. 354 P.3d 302 (overruling Henkel).
160. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 37(2) (Proposed Final Draft)
(AM. LAW INST. Mar. 28, 2017).
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an underlying insurer increases the odds that a claim has been fairly thor-
oughly tested and thus gives the excess insurer some protection against its
attachment point being reached too easily because of insufficient defense
of claims at lower levels of the liability insurance tower.
Those protections are not worth the costs imposed by way of dispro-
portionate forfeiture, unfair windfall, impeded settlement, and collateral
costs, but there is at least a basis for the presence of the underlying-
insurer-must-pay requirement. By contrast, there is arguably no basis for en-
forcing an anti-assignment clause after a loss has occurred. At that point, the
identity of the policyholder is irrelevant. And, of course, the purpose of the
anti-assignment clause was fully met in that the policyholder who bought
the policy was the policyholder at the time of loss. There was no increase
of risk due to any change in the identity of the policyholder prior to the
events creating the claim. 161
Although imperfect, the analogy to anti-assignment clauses nonethe-
less provides a good example of where courts have properly declined to
give literal enforcement to policy text. As noted above, insurance law doc-
trine provides similar illustrations of situations where literal textual en-
forcement has properly been rejected by the courts. In addition to judicial
modification of notice and cooperation policy provisions, proof of claim
requirements have not been strictly enforced. 162
Non-insurance law provides additional examples of judicial refusal to
give literal enforcement to contract text that is considered unnecessary
to vindicate the legitimate interests of the party seeking to enforce the
text. For example, contracts frequently contain liquidated damages provi-
sions setting a specific amount of compensation to be paid in the event of
breach. Even as between two sophisticated contracting parties with simi-
lar bargaining power, courts will not enforce liquidated damages provi-
sions unless the actual damages for breach are difficult to calculate and
the amount of the liquidated damages is not so excessive as to amount
to a penalty.163
161. See Fluor Corp., 354 P.3d 302. However, Henkel, although wrongly decided, articu-
lated a rationale for its resistance to post-loss assignment based on the purported risk that
liability insurers could be saddled with multiple defense and indemnity obligations (or at
least uncertainty regarding those obligations) due to changes in corporate form that accom-
panied transfer of policy rights. The concern, although overdone, had some plausibility. On
close enough empirical analysis, excess insurer justifications for needing the protection of re-
quiring that payment come only from underlying insurers could prove as exaggerated as the
concerns of the Henkel insurers that were used initially to persuade the California Supreme
Court.
162. See Cisneros v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 134 F.3d 939, 945 (1998).
163. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Dam-
ages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount
that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the dif-
ficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforce-
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Similarly, even clear contract document text subjecting an employee or
business partner to restrictions on competition after practice are not given
literal enforcement where the noncompete clause constitutes too great a
restriction on the departing employee or partner. 164 "In general . . .
post-employment restraints are sustained only if the employer stands to
lose its investment in confidential information relating to some process
or method-sometimes loosely called a 'trade secret'-or in customer
lists or similar information." 165
Judicial attitudes toward liquidated damages and covenants not to
compete share a kinship with judicial attitudes toward late notice, failure
to cooperate, proof of claim, and assignment in the insurance context.
able on grounds of public policy as a penalty."); UCC § 2-718(1) ("Damages for breach by
either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in
the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of
loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasiblity of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.");
FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 12.18; PERILLO, supra note 78, § 14.33. See, e.g., Carr-
Gottstein Props., Ltd. P'ship v. Benedict, 72 P.3d 308 (Alaska 2003) (upholding $25 per
day specified damages for delay in finishing construction as reasonable in light of amount
and purpose of protecting aesthetics of neighborhood that would be compromised by pro-
longed construction in residential area); Nohe v. Roblyn Dev. Corp., 686 A.2d 382 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (prohibiting retention of nearly $80,000 deposit as liquidated
damages for breach of sale contract for residential property); Kvassey v. Murray, 808 P.2d
896 (Kan. 1991) (refusing to enforce liquidated damages clause where amount deemed
well in excess of actual loss), reprinted in EPSTEIN, MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra note 94,
at 823-35.
One can criticize this approach as overly paternalistic, at least where the contracting par-
ties are sophisticated and the specified damages provision was negotiated and understood. See
Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1288-90 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying
Illinois law) (per Judge Richard Posner); Charles Goetz & Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages,
Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). But it is nonethe-
less well-established law. And it is law that results in courts refusing to give literal enforce-
ment to textual provisions with economic consequences far less severe than the forfeitures
created by anti-Zeig provisions in excess policies.
164. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 5.3; PERILLO, supra note 78, § 14.31. See, e.g.,
Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151 (Nev. 2016) (refusing to enforce covenant
not to compete that barred departing casino worker from finding work at other casinos on
the Las Vegas Strip); Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999) (refusing
to enforce covenant not to compete of a medical practice group because enforcement would
effectively prohibit physician leaving group from practicing anywhere in the Phoenix metro-
politan area for three years). Courts divide somewhat on whether an overreaching noncom-
pete clause is to be given no effect or whether the court may modify the clause to eliminate
unconscionable provisions or terms in violation of public policy. Compare Valley Medical Spe-
cialists, 982 P.2d 1277 (modifying offending clause), with Islam, 376 P.3d 151 (refusing to re-
write clause and striking it). But see id. at 163 (Pickering, Hardesty, and Parraguirre, JJ., dis-
senting) (arguing for modification or "blue-penciling" of such clauses rather than total
elimination from the contract and noting that this is the majority approach).
165. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 5.3 at 324-25. "Against this interest in a workable
relationship, courts balance the public interest in individual economic freedom, free dissemi-
nation of ideas, and reallocation of labor to areas of greatest productivity. Because post-
employment restraints are often the product of unequal bargaining power and may inflict un-
anticipated hardship on the employee, they are scrutinized with more care than are covenants
in the sale of a business." Id. at 325. Accord PERILLO, supra note 78, § 16.19.
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Collectively, these sub-doctrines demonstrate that it is not at all uncom-
mon for courts to refuse to give literal application to the text of an insur-
ance policy or contract document where such literal enforcement under-
mines the goals and purpose of the instrument or other public policy
goals.166 Although there is a split of authority, many courts take a similar
attitude toward waivers of liability 167 and disclaimers or limitations of
remedies. 168
As these instances show, literal application need not bring absurd or un-
conscionable results to be eschewed by a court. It is sufficient to defeat strict
enforcement if such literal application brings unwise deleterious effects. And
as demonstrated by the liquidated damages and noncompete clause cases,
courts deny literal enforcement of problematic text even in cases where the
aggrieved party was almost surely aware of the term and where the term
was in all likelihood specifically discussed and negotiated.
166. For more than thirty years, the American Law Institute has taken the position that
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy
if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is
clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement
of such terms.
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is taken of
(a) The parties' justified expectations,
(b) Any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and
(c) Any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken of
(a) The strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions,
(b) The likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy,
(c) The seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it was delib-
erate, and
(d) The directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178.
167. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, §§ 4.26-4.27, 5.2, 11.8; PERILLO, supra note 78,
§ 14.22; C. Connor Crook, Validity and Enforceability of Liability Waivers in Ski Lift Tickets,
28 CAMPBELL L. REV. 107 (2005). See, e.g., Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d
734 (Conn. 2005) (refusing to enforce waiver of liability signed by patron as condition of ski-
ing); Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963) (refusing to en-
force hospital's waiver of liability for negligence); Herningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161
A.2d 69, 87-94 (NJ. 1960) (refusing to enforce warranty disclaimer).
168. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, §§ 4.26-4.27, 5.2, 11.8; PERILLO, supra note 78,§ 14.22. See, e.g., Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir.
1986) (applying Oregon law and refusing to enforce clause eliminating consequential dam-
ages for breach but conducting unconscionability/public policy analysis in the context of
UCC § 2-207).
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V. CONCLUSION
Measured against well-established principles of both general contract law
and insurance contract law as well as the important function of excess in-
surance, the Qualcomm approach of literal enforcement of anti-Zeig lan-
guage should be treated as an erroneous aberration rather than something
to emulate. By supporting Qualcomm, the ALI has taken the wrong fork of
the road to follow a direction at odds with both its own professed insur-
ance and contract values of nonforfeiture, purposive construction, and
sound public policy.

